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Since the 1960’s, companies have searched for competitive advantage from offshoring 
their manufacturing processes to countries of lower labour cost, or countries that are lo-
cated closer to interesting markets. However, since about 2005, the trend has partly re-
versed: large amounts of offshoring projects face unprecedented costs and setbacks, mak-
ing domestic production more favourable again. The reasons for both offshoring and 
backshoring of production have been studied in detail, but little focus has been given to 
how those decisions unfold day by day in the board rooms. 
In this study, three case companies, one offshoring case and two backshoring cases, were 
interviewed to find out how manufacturing relocation decisions are really made. The in-
vestigation was divided into four major sub-questions: how could the case decisions pro-
cesses be modelled; what is the role of management accounting information in those de-
cisions; what factors affect the risk perceptions of decision makers, and; how could the 
decision making processes be improved. 
It was found that offshoring and backshoring decisions are very different by nature due 
to the differences in uncertainty that the decision makers have to deal with. The myriad 
of options and factors present in choosing an offshore location from anywhere in the 
world translates into huge information and accounting needs, as well as complex decision 
making processes including several nested subdecisions. Meanwhile backshoring deci-
sions were found to be very straightforward, less reliant on large amounts of accounting 
information and less time consuming to implement. This is due to the fact that these de-
cisions usually consider only two locations, the offshored and the domestic location, both 
of which are well known and measured. The case companies were also asked to determine 
what parts of the decisions they would want to improve the most. The high level conclu-
sion is that companies that seek global success should remain extra vigilant of the im-
mense complexity of these decisions, and that there is a clear need to quantify and con-
cretify the benefits of domestic production, such as quality, flexibility and trust between 
suppliers and partners. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
When companies face pressures to improve their profitability, the low hanging fruit are 
often searched for abroad. The last two or three decades have been marked by legions of 
companies in the developed countries relocating their manufacturing activities to coun-
tries where they can, first and foremost, enjoy substantially lower labor costs (Karmarkar 
2004; Lewin & Peeters 2006), and choosing to concentrate their domestic presence on 
core activities that cannot be outsourced or offshored.  
However, many of these offshoring projects face unexpected difficulties and realizations 
of unforeseen risks, relating especially to shortcomings in flexibility, quality and ability 
to supply the global supply chain (Kinkel & Maloca 2009). On the other hand, external 
changes in the business environment, such as lack of client acceptance, political backlash 
or demand fluctuation, add to the pool of arguments that have caused many companies to 
relocate manufacturing back to the country of origin (Lewin & Peeters 2006; Gylling et 
al. 2015). 
Backshoring took off as a global phenomenon after roughly 2005 (Kinkel 2012; Tate 
2014). The reason why the trend took off in this point in time has been accredited to 
increases in domestic productivity and new-found salience of hard-to-measure qualities, 
such as the value of strict property rights and ease of innovation and product development 
in domestic locations (Tate 2014). The emergence of backshoring seems to have caused 
a renewed academic interest in manufacturing relocation decisions, both offshoring and 
backshoring (Mihalache & Mihalache 2015; Stentoft et al. 2016). The research has un-
covered, among other things, a comprehensive set of reasons that most often drive relo-
cations one way or the other, how those projects are controlled and coordinated, and the 
expected success or profitability of the relocations (Mihalache & Mihalache 2015). How-
ever, much remains to be investigated about how the decisions are triggered and carried 
out in board rooms, how management accounting information is utilized in the decisions 
and how the decision making processes themselves could be developed. Understanding 
these aspects is crucially important, because all successful and failed projects originate in 
the decision making process. Pointing out specific weak points in the decision routines of 
case companies or identifying gaps in accounting information could provide concrete im-
provements into how offshoring and backshoring projects unfold globally. 
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1.2 Objectives and scope 
This thesis is concerned with understanding how the decisions to move manufacturing 
abroad and back again unfold phase by phase in the board rooms. The specific objective 
is set as 
“to advance knowledge about how real offshoring and backshoring decision pro-
cesses take place and how management accounting is utilized in them, and to pro-
vide input into how the processes can be developed”.  
As the work on the thesis proceeded, the literature review uncovered four specific re-
search gaps that became the four research questions for this thesis: 
1. How can offshoring and backshoring decisions be modeled? 
2. What is the role of managerial accounting information in them? 
3. What factors influence decision makers’ assessments of risks and benefits in these 
decisions? 
4. How could companies make more effective offshoring and backshoring deci-
sions? 
The motivation to choose this topic builds on findings from the ROaMING research pro-
ject mainly executed and managed by the Center for Research on Operations, Projects 
and Services (CROPS) at Tampere University of Technology (TUT). Significant contri-
butions to the project is also provided from the Cost Management Center (CMC) at TUT, 
under which the research for this thesis was conducted. CMC’s role in the project is to 
concentrate on the role of management accounting information in a holistic decision mak-
ing environment, that is not constrained to mere rational optimization. In other words, the 
whole decision making process is considered in order to best make sense of the use of 
accounting information. 
Put shortly, ROaMING concentrates on investigating offshoring and backshoring activity 
in Nordic companies, the reasons for it, the decision making processes relating to it and 
the role of ecosystems and innovations in it (Heikkilä et al. 2015). Further motivation for 
the topic of this thesis is added by the researcher’s genuine interest in understanding the 
behavior and decision making of top executives.  
The scope of the research is limited to Finnish medium or large sized enterprises. How-
ever, the results are not specifically bounded to apply only to Finnish or Nordic countries.  
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1.3 Research process 
The research was conducted as a case study with semi-structured interviews as the main 
data gathering method. An interventionist element was also included in an effort to vali-
date the effectiveness of suggestions to improve the decision making processes of case 
companies. 
The research process started with establishing a research relationship with two Finnish 
companies. The case of interest in the first of these was an offshoring decision, and a 
backshoring decision in the other. Later on a third company with a backshoring focus was 
contacted and included in the research. The theoretical background for systematically an-
alyzing results was drafted before the collection of data was begun. The research objective 
was pursued next by interviewing 2-4 people from each company. The interviews ad-
vanced in a design where the first interview was spent in constructing a basic timeline of 
how the decision process unfolded, followed by interviews that concentrated on filling 
gaps on the timeline and understanding under-the-surface factors that affected decision 
making along the process. After analyzing the interview data with respect to the theoret-
ical background, the research results and recommendations for improving the decision 
making processes were sent for review to the interviewees, who were also asked to com-
ment about the real life practicality of the recommendations. These comments provided 
further value into whether the suggested improvements would actually be worth consid-
ering in a global decision making context. Finally, a synthesis of all analyzed data was 
formed in order to answer the research questions in a systematic manner.   
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis contains six chapters. The objectives and contents of the remaining chapters 
can be described as follows: 
Chapter 2 pinpoints specific questions under the theme of manufacturing location deci-
sions to which this thesis sets out to provide answers. The chapter first presents a literature 
review, providing an overview of definitions, brief history and recent research in the field. 
The last section presents the research questions, which are targeted at identified research 
gaps from the review.  
Chapter 3 is concerned with forming a theoretical background to support the selected 
research questions. The chapter seeks to build rigid frameworks with which the questions 
can be approached purposefully and the gathered data analyzed systematically. 
Chapter 4 introduces the researcher’s choices of research methodology and data gathering 
methods, including an assessment of vulnerabilities relating to validity, reliability and 
generalizability of the results. In the last section, the research process is described in more 
detail, including short descriptions of the case companies. 
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Chapter 5 presents the results of the research case by case, along with a general synthesis 
of what implications the results have in relation to each other.  
The sixth and final chapter provides answers to the research questions, an assessment of 
research contributions and managerial implications, limitations and suggestions for fur-
ther research.  
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2. OFFSHORING AND BACKSHORING: LITERA-
TURE REVIEW 
This chapter is structured as follows. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 include important definitions 
and a brief look at the history of offshoring and backshoring manufacturing as a global 
phenomenon. Section 2.3 introduces recent findings from research done in the field, from 
which research gaps are identified. The fourth and final section formulates the research 
questions of this thesis in order to fill the identified research gaps. 
2.1 Definitions of offshoring and backshoring 
Offshoring relates to moving manufacturing or other business processes out of the country 
to a subsidiary, while ownership and control are kept internal to the company (Lewin & 
Peeters 2006). Offshoring should be distinguished from the term outsourcing, where own-
ership and control are transferred to a third party. (Bettis et al. 1992). Kinkel and Maloca 
(2009) specify the former type of offshoring as captive offshoring. Offshoring is usually 
a more intensive and risky exercise in internationalization than outsourcing, because firms 
are left with the challenge of coordinating and integrating the offshored operations with 
the rest of the global organization (Larsen et al. 2013; Srikanth & Puranam 2011).  
Moving business processes in the opposite direction, or repatriating them, has been 
termed internal backshoring (Kinkel & Maloca 2009), insourcing (Arlbjørn & Mikkelsen 
2014) and reshoring (Tate 2014). For the purposes of this thesis, the term backshoring is 
adopted, as it more fittingly separates production movement back to the country of origin 
from moving production between two foreign locations, which might more aptly be de-
fined as reshoring. A clarifying schematic of these various terms is presented in Figure 1: 
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Figure 1: Terms for relocating production (adapted from K.C. 2015) 
As for the rest of this thesis, the chosen terms of interest will be simply offshoring and 
backshoring, so that they specifically refer to moving manufacturing facilities across na-
tional boundaries and back to the country of origin while retaining ownership and control 
of the facilities, unless specified otherwise. 
For consistency, some quotes from literature sources that use the term reshoring in the 
same meaning as backshoring have been revised to include the term backshoring. 
2.2 Brief history of offshoring and backshoring production 
Offshoring as a phenomenon is not new, as various forms of it has taken place for more 
than 50 years (Ferdows 1997). Important drivers for offshoring in the early years included 
cheap competing imports and rising labor costs in developed countries, which conse-
quently pushed companies to offshore their production to developing countries (Moxon 
1975). The popularity of offshoring has gained a new boost over the last two decades, 
mainly due to advances in information technology and global cost differentials 
(Karmarkar 2004; Lewin & Peeters 2006). Along this boost also SMEs have become in-
creasingly active in international production (Kinkel & Maloca 2009). Arriving at accu-
rate numbers about what percentage of companies in developed countries own offshored 
production is very difficult, because making the distinction between outsourcing, offshor-
ing and various types of supplier relationships is not easy from outside the companies in 
question. Nevertheless, some indication of the popularity of offshore activities can be 
drawn from articles in the Economist. It is stated that the share of American and European 
companies’ overseas production contracts with an ownership element (meaning at least 
some degree of ownership is retained) was estimated as 69 % in 2012 (Economist 2013a). 
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Furthermore, the annual negative impact of offshoring on US jobs has been estimated to 
be between 150 000 and 650 000 (Economist 2013b). 
The phenomenon of bringing production back has become increasingly prevalent since 
roughly 2005 (Kinkel 2012; Tate 2014; Fratocchi et al. 2014). The specific drivers for 
this to happen in this point in time specifically are largely uncertain, but one explanation 
could be the rise in domestic productivity brought about by technological innovations 
(Tate 2014) such as cutting-edge robotics and automation. According to Kinkel (2014) 
for every three offshoring companies in Germany there is now one active in backshoring 
production. In a recent survey to 320 U.S. companies, 40 % reported perceiving a trend 
toward backshoring to the United States (Tate 2014). In addition, according to a survey 
by the Boston Consulting Group, more than half of over 200 U.S. companies with sales 
greater than $1 billion are moving production back (Boston Consulting Group 2013). 
Some global reasons for this trend might have included the 2008 recession (Ellram, Tate 
& Petersen 2013; Ellram, Tate & Feitzinger 2013), the rising cost of labor in developing 
countries, high oil prices, increased transportation costs and a growing awareness of 
global supply chain risks (Tate 2014). 
The impact of backshoring has attracted attention from governments as well (Stentoft et 
al. 2016), due to reasons such as job creation, potential for key innovations and the po-
tential to increased exports and reduced imports (EPRS 2014). Some examples of con-
crete measures to incentivize bringing production back include Germany’s 200 million 
euro “Industrie 4.0” program (Germany Trade & Invest 2014) and the U.S.’s 40 million 
dollar “Make it in America” initiative (Weisfuse & Comerford 2014), which aim at 
providing grants to backshoring projects. 
These figures paint a clear picture: offshoring took off in around the 1960’s and gained 
speed as globalization took its first steps in the world, but in the 21st century the parame-
ters of global production have seemed to change in a way that producing domestically 
has become interesting again. The next section will examine existing research on what 
exactly those changes and factors might be. 
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2.3 Recent research in the field and identified research gaps 
The study of offshoring has been active since the 80’s but there has been a clear increase 
in research activity after the turn of the century (Mihalache & Mihalache 2015), possibly 
mirroring the emergence of the backshoring trend. Figure 2 illustrates this increase year 
by year: 
 
Figure 2: The frequency of published research articles on offshoring from 1988 to 
2014 (Mihalache & Mihalache 2015) 
 
In the same article, Mihalache & Mihalache (2015) break down how researchers have 
focused on different aspects of offshoring. Table 1: Articles on offshoring 1988 to 2014 
by category (Mihalache & Mihalache 2015) lists these focus areas and the amount of 
research papers analyzed by Mihalache & Mihalache – a proxy for the amount of general 
academic interest in each of the areas. The table also highlights select areas of interest for 
this thesis:  
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Table 1: Articles on offshoring 1988 to 2014 by category (Mihalache & Mihalache 
2015) 
Topic Questions of interest 
Amount of 
articles 
Ownership decision What factors affect the choice of ownership? 12 
Partner choice decision 
How do firms select offshore vendors for out-
sourced activities? 
13 
Control & coordination 
decision 
What control and coordination options do 
firms have? What drives their costs? 
40 
Deciding which business 
activity to offshore 
How do characteristics of the activity affect the 
risks of offshoring? 
10 
Making the offshoring de-
cision 
What are the motivations and risks of offshor-
ing? 
53 
Location decisions 
What factors affect the choice of the offshore 
location? 
28 
Offshoring performance 
How well do offshoring projects meet their ob-
jectives? 
24 
Firm level outcomes 
What effects do offshoring decisions have on 
the companies? 
27 
Macro level outcomes What effects does offshoring have globally? 6 
 
The three highlighted research areas are selected because they most closely relate to the 
specific step-by-step decision making processes that are in the focus of this thesis. Re-
search from these areas will be examined in detail through sections 2.3.1 – 2.3.4. 
A similar systematic review on the side of backshoring was made by Stentoft et al. (2016), 
who witnessed a considerable increase in the amount of backshoring articles since 2012. 
They categorized articles on backshoring and related themes in terms of research meth-
odology, industry type and the specific drivers that emerge as causes to backshoring de-
cisions. They found 20 articles from 2009-2016 that directly addressed backshoring, ac-
companied with more that covered related themes. Table 2: Backshoring drivers and spe-
cific issues covered in articles 2009 to 2016 (Stentoft et al. 2016) presents the seven driver 
categories into which Stentoft et al. distributed the articles they analyzed: 
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Table 2: Backshoring drivers and specific issues covered in articles 2009 to 2016 
(Stentoft et al. 2016) 
Driver examined Specific issues Selected articles 
Cost 
Cost of labor, logistics, energy; 
eroding cost advantage; miscalcu-
lation of costs; productivity differ-
ences; need for small production 
runs 
(Kinkel 2012; Kinkel 2014; 
Fratocchi et al. 2014; Gylling 
et al. 2015) 
Quality Quality not at an acceptable level 
(Arlbjørn & Mikkelsen 2014; 
Kinkel & Maloca 2009) 
Time and flexibility 
Delivery lead-time; demand vola-
tility; production and delivery reli-
ability 
(Fratocchi et al. 2014; Kinkel 
2014; Bailey & Propris 2014) 
Access to skills and 
knowledge 
Proximity to R&D and resources; 
availability of skilled labor; utili-
zation of new technologies and au-
tomation 
(Arlbjørn & Mikkelsen 2014; 
Bailey & Propris 2014; 
Stentoft et al. 2015) 
Risks 
Threat of losing know-how and in-
tellectual property; supply chain 
risks; volatility in exchange rates 
(Gray et al. 2013; Tate 2014; 
Gylling et al. 2015) 
Market 
Loyalty/patriotism; value of 
“Made in X”; staying close to cus-
tomers; shrinking market size 
(Canham & Hamilton 2013) 
Other factors 
Incentives from governments; in-
creased focus on core activities; 
correction of a misjudged decision 
(Arlbjørn & Mikkelsen 2014; 
Stentoft et al. 2015; Tate 
2014) 
 
It can be concluded that the majority of current backshoring literature concentrates on 
understanding the driving reasons to backshore. As Stentoft et al. (2016) explicitly note, 
no articles seemed to cover specifically the decision making process that led to the actual 
backshoring of manufacturing – how exactly did the decision makers receive, use and 
analyze information from various sources to form the initial motivation to backshore? 
Hence there is a clear gap in the literature, calling for case-based research on how some 
of these decisions unfolded. 
The next four sections present a selection of studies that exemplify the current under-
standing of the areas of interest highlighted in Table 1, but in a manner that both offshor-
ing and backshoring aspects are taken into account, where appropriate.  
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2.3.1 Motivations for offshoring and backshoring 
Research has discovered plenty of indications that the reasons for offshoring and back-
shoring decisions differ significantly. Offshoring was and still is practiced mainly in order 
to cut production costs and improve distribution and productivity (Kinkel 2012; Heikkilä 
et al. 2016; Ferdows 1997; K.C. 2015). Kedia and Mukherjee (2009) identified further 
reasons, arguing that the competitive advantage of offshoring can stem from disintegra-
tion (e.g. innovation, speed, flexibility and cost reduction), location-specific resourcing 
(e.g. infrastructure and human capital) or externalization (e.g. learning and specializa-
tion).  
Ferdows (1997) lists a variety of reasons for offshoring with respect to tangibility, as 
presented in Figure 3: 
 
Figure 3: Reasons for offshoring with respect to tangibility (Ferdows 1997) 
Apart from the mentioned reasons, offshoring can also act as an enabler for competitive-
ness. In the interesting case of Helkama, a Finnish manufacturer of the popular bike model 
“Jopo”, offshoring of production was not only primarily a cost cutting exercise, but it also 
provided the company a chance to breathe and critically assess their production methods 
in Finland. In the end, streamlining the domestic facility became a significant factor in 
making domestic production favorable again (Gylling et al. 2015). The facility would 
probably not have had a chance to become competitive without first offshoring the pro-
duction to make room for improvement. 
Lastly, Pennings & Sleuwaegen (2000) provide insight into what kind of companies have 
a higher propensity to offshore manufacturing: companies that operate within labor in-
tensive industries, that are larger in size, that are more profitable or that belong to a mul-
tinational group tend to relocate manufacturing abroad more often than other companies. 
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On the other hand, companies that have no previous experience of foreign direct invest-
ments are less likely to relocate (Pennings & Sleuwaegen 2000).   
The reasons for backshoring are somewhat more complex. The overarching reason for 
backshoring is some form of dissatisfaction with the performance of the offshored facility 
or process. In 2005, Boston Consulting Group and Gartner predicted that about 50 % of 
all offshoring contracts signed by US companies between 2001 – 2004 would fail to meet 
expectations (Aron & Singh 2005). The amount of backshoring since 2005 testifies that 
their prediction was right to a significant degree. 
The actual driving reasons to backshore can be categorized into two groups. On one hand, 
many offshoring companies fail to generate expected benefits due to inadequate calcula-
tion of operational and structural risks, lack of knowledge about the foreign destination, 
or lack of systematic location planning, leading to unforeseen costs and difficulties in 
managing the offshoring operation (Stringfellow et al. 2008; Larsen et al. 2013; Aron & 
Singh 2005; Anderson et al. 1998). A survey for 200+ Finnish companies by Heikkilä et 
al. (2016) speaks a similar story, as it concluded that the main reasons to backshore pro-
duction back to Finland are flexibility, quality, lead time and logistics costs.  
On the other hand, production might be repatriated after there is a change in the compet-
itive environment that makes domestic production desirable again, such as demand fluc-
tuation (de Treville & Trigeorgis 2010; Gylling et al. 2015). These cases could be cate-
gorized differently from the aforementioned, since they do not necessarily involve an 
internal miscalculation of the current situation and manufacturing needs.  
Selected key reasons for both offshoring and backshoring are summarized in Table 3: 
Summary of key reasons for offshoring and backshoring. 
Table 3: Summary of key reasons for offshoring and backshoring 
Reasons for offshoring Reasons for backshoring 
 Reduce direct and indirect costs 
 Reduce capital costs 
 Reduce taxes 
 Reduce logistics costs 
 Overcome tariff barriers 
 Provide better customer service 
 Spread foreign exchange risks 
 Build alternative supply sources 
 Eroding cost difference 
 Quality 
 Time and flexibility 
 Lead-time 
 Demand volatility 
 Proximity to R&D and product de-
velopment 
 
 
To summarize, the reasons to offshore and backshore are understood rather well: compa-
nies offshore mostly due to production costs, and backshore due to quality and flexibility 
issues, or due to a change in the global competitive environment. The next interesting 
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topic examined in the next section is that of how the risks of these decisions are perceived 
at the company level.  
2.3.2 Risks for offshoring and backshoring 
Offshoring and backshoring are investment decisions that involve risk by definition. What 
separates offshoring from other kinds of manufacturing investments is mainly the 
physical distance between decision makers and the final production location, as well as 
the factor of cultural differences between nations. Gray et al. (2011) learned, for example, 
that offshoring is correlated with an increased quality risk due to difficulty of transferring 
all the necessary knowledge to retain a desired level of quality.  
A variety of specific offshoring risks can be listed as follows (Lewin & Peeters 2006): 
 Lack of data security 
 Lack of cultural fit 
 Poor quality 
 Loss of control 
 Lack of client acceptance 
 Political backlash 
 Disaster recovery 
 Infrastructure instability in host country 
 Operational inefficiency 
 Employee turnover  
 Weakening employee morale 
As can be seen, the decrease in costs that motivates offshoring is effectively “paid for” 
by a multitude of new risks. There is, however, an additional category of risk relating to 
the decision process itself. The risks identified by Lewin & Peeters assume that the off-
shoring decision and implementation was successful in and of itself. Kinkel & Maloca 
(2009) explored risks internal to the decision process and argue that the realized risks that 
trigger backshoring decisions most often relate to unexpected shortcomings in flexibility, 
ability to supply the global supply chain and quality, implying that there is a significant 
risk of simply doing an ill-informed decision in the first place. They state that offshoring 
decisions should in fact never be based solely on labor cost comparisons – which para-
doxically is the main reason to offshore. Therefore, there are two main categories for the 
riskiness of an offshoring decision: internal risks originating from the decision making 
prior to offshoring and external risks that originate in the lessened control, increased dis-
tance and differing cultural settings once the decision is implemented. Figure 5 clarifies 
this dichotomy:  
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Figure 4: Internal and external risks of offshoring 
The risks of backshoring have not been studied in detail, but they can be expected to be 
smaller compared to offshoring, since organizations have more control on and infor-
mation about manufacturing that takes place closer to where decisions are made. Simi-
larly, the internal risks can be expected to be lesser, since backshored facilities are set up 
in a familiar country to the decision makers by definition. Even though in some cases the 
labor costs are returned to a higher level than during the offshoring period, it is the recov-
ered amount of certainty that lowers risks. 
While the risks are generally well understood at the firm level, no publications were found 
to have taken a proactive viewpoint into how perceptions of risk are created for individual 
decision makers. This gap in the literature has been explicitly recognized by Mihalache 
& Mihalache (2015): 
”[Further research is needed to] advance knowledge on the factors that influence 
decision-makers’ assessments of offshoring’s benefits and risks such as offshoring 
experience.”(Mihalache & Mihalache 2015) 
 Especially interesting would be to understand what qualities, quantitative or qualitative, 
of specific location options cause specific perceptions of risk to emerge in decision mak-
ers’ minds. 
2.3.3 Factors affecting the choice of an offshore location 
After the initial motivation to offshore production somewhere, the problem of choosing 
a location arises next. Hahn et al. (2009) argue that the main factors that influence the 
location choice include wages, education, language and risk. They also emphasize the 
fact that while cost reduction seems to be the main driver to execute an offshoring deci-
sion, its role in directing the actual location decision diminishes to being one of several 
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important factors. This makes sense, because in the end, there is no gain in offshoring if 
the relocated facility is not manageable due to language barriers, poor worker skills or 
other such risks.  
Glaister & Demirbag (2010) found that at the firm level previous experience of either 
similar offshore activities or activity within the targeted country increase the likelihood 
to relocate to that country. The degree of standardization is also an important factor that 
affects location decisions: tasks of high standardization and low complexity tend to be 
relocated to Asia, Central Europe or Eastern Europe (Jensen & Pedersen 2011). 
While these studies provide a good overview of the things that have affected location 
decisions, they are all retrospective. They do not capture the viewpoint of active decision 
making – in what sort of situations are the factors mentioned considered, how are they 
analyzed and what factors act as the crucial ones that make or break an individual decision 
about a location? This is another viewpoint that this thesis tries to clarify.  
2.3.4 Offshoring performance 
Once the decision to offshore has been made, the crucial phase of implementing begins. 
As mentioned before, there is a rather high probability that these projects face unexpected 
costs or other problems that for some reason could not be seen beforehand. The literature 
on offshoring performance seeks to understand what are the most important factors that 
determine the success of an offshoring decision. 
One way to approach this problem is to find out where the unexpected costs and problems 
most often originate from. According to Dibbern et al. (2008), extra costs are mainly 
incurred due to four types of activities: requirements specification and design, knowledge 
transfer, control and coordination. They also mention that cultural and geographical dis-
tance between locations seems to increase the extra costs.  
A second approach is to directly investigate projects that have succeeded well. Indications 
can be drawn for example from the area of information technology outsourcing, which 
has been studied to a greater detail than manufacturing offshoring. Three major categories 
of determinants for IT outsourcing success included decision making, contractual gov-
ernance and relational governance (Lacity et al. 2009). First, decisions that included the 
involvement of senior managers and rigorous evaluation processes were associated with 
higher levels of outsourcing success. Second, strong contractual governance refers to 
more contract detail, shorter-term contracts and higher-dollar valued contracts, which is 
also connected to better performance. Third, relational governance was found to improve 
performance through trust, norms, open communication, open sharing of information, 
mutual dependency and cooperation.  
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One further aspect is to understand how offshoring performance could be secured prior 
to making a decision. K.C. (2015) suggests three specific items that should be considered 
especially by SME’s. First, companies should thoroughly understand their costs in the 
entire value chain. Cost analysis should be rigorous enough to provide a comparative 
analysis of both direct and indirect costs in both the domestic and foreign scenarios, while 
also taking into account the uncertainty with unexpected costs that can arise from the 
decision. Second, networking and partnering with other companies is important, which 
can open possibilities to both information sharing, innovation and other synergy benefits. 
Third, companies should understand their target markets and what their customers really 
value.  
Room remains for further studies into this final aspect. In addition to these high-level 
factors mentioned, how should managers manage their day-to-day decision making pro-
cess to ensure successful relocation decisions? 
2.4 Research questions  
As an understanding of current research in offshoring and backshoring decisions has been 
established, the research questions for this thesis can be set. The research objective was 
set in section 1.2 as  
“to advance knowledge about how real offshoring and backshoring decision pro-
cesses take place and how management accounting is utilized in them, and to pro-
vide input to how the processes can be developed.” 
The research objective will be guided by four research questions, as outlined in Table 4: 
The research questions of the thesis 
Table 4: The research questions of the thesis 
Research question Main source of identified 
research gap 
1. How can offshoring and backshoring decision 
processes be modeled? 
ROaMING project (Heikkilä 
2015) 
2. What is the role of managerial accounting in-
formation in them? 
3. What factors influence decision makers’ as-
sessments of risks and benefits relating to off-
shoring and backshoring of production? 
(Mihalache & Mihalache 2015; 
Stentoft et al. 2016)  
4. How could companies make more effective off-
shoring and backshoring decisions? 
(K.C. 2015) 
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The motivation for the first and second questions comes from the aforementioned ROaM-
ING-project, as one of the major research questions for the whole project is (Heikkilä 
2015): 
“How do companies make decisions about [back]shoring production and innova-
tions related to it, and what is the role of management accounting information in 
this decision making?” 
It should be noted that even though not stated in the ROaMING research question, all 
research questions of this thesis address not only backshoring decisions, but offshoring 
as well. While ROaMING has gained some ground into understanding the amount and 
type of decisions made and the high-level reasons for them, the actual day-to-day tasks 
and processes relating to the decisions have not been investigated (Heikkilä et al. 2016; 
Stentoft et al. 2016). The literature review confirmed the view that little research into this 
specific issue has been made so far. Thus one of the objectives of this thesis is to investi-
gate and describe those processes in their natural surroundings, with a special focus on 
how management accounting information is utilized.   
The third question is motivated by a need to understand what inputs and attributes affect 
the way managers assess different location options. Mihalache and Mihalache (2015) ex-
plicitly identified a gap in the offshoring literature as follows: 
”[Further research is needed to] advance knowledge on the factors that influence 
decision-makers’ assessments of offshoring’s benefits and risks such as offshoring 
experience.” (Mihalache & Mihalache 2015) 
On the other side, Stentoft et al. (2016) identify in their review article a similar gap in the 
literature concerning backshoring: 
“Future research should address the questions of accessibility, relevance, repre-
sentation, and accessibility of data for decision making about offshoring and 
[back]shoring.” (Stentoft et al. 2016) 
Combining these two gaps in literature, it can be said that there is a call for future research 
to take a step deeper into what factors are at play when an individual seeks information 
and perceives risks related to offshoring and backshoring investment options under un-
certainty.  
Finally, a master’s thesis on the reasons behind offshoring and backshoring by K.C. 
(2015) done at Tampere University of Technology concluded that further research should 
be directed towards understanding how companies (especially SMEs) could improve their 
offshoring and backshoring decision making processes: 
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 “It is … worth looking into how SMEs can make informed offshoring/[back]shor-
ing decisions in order to avoid circumstances threatening their sustainability.” 
(K.C. 2015) 
This research gap, also confirmed by the literature review into offshoring performance, 
is in a natural continuum with the first two identified gaps – after gaining a better under-
standing of how the decisions are really executed in the field and investigating what fac-
tors and sources of information cause various perceptions of risk and benefit, the next 
step is to exploit these insights to pursue efficiency and effectiveness in the decision mak-
ing process. This is the goal set by the third research question. 
The first and second questions call for an ability to describe real life decision making 
processes. This could be achieved by constructing clear timelines of how the decision 
process unfolded and investigating via the interviews what roles management accounting 
information fulfilled during the decision process. The third question then concentrates on 
inputs to and instances in the process that affected how decision makers viewed the de-
sirability or riskiness of different options – does some information affect perceptions 
more than others, and do they create bias rather than clarify the situation in a relevant 
manner? Finally, after a baseline of how things are has been established, the fourth ques-
tion seeks to find possible improvements in the process. This can be established through 
an interventionist approach, where the researcher suggests improvements into the deci-
sion process for the case companies and draws insights from their feedback.  
In order to simplify the reading experience of the thesis document, the later sections will 
be presented under “research themes” that relate to each of the three research questions. 
In this manner, the reader will have an easier time keeping track of the purpose of each 
section. The themes are assigned as follows: 
- Research question 1: Decision making processes 
- Research question 2: Role of management accounting information 
- Research question 3: Perception of risk and benefit 
- Research question 4: Efficiency of decision making 
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3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: MANAGE-
MENT ACCOUNTING AND DECISION MAKING 
This chapter aims at building relevant theoretical frameworks and systematic approaches 
in order to answer the research questions. Section 3.1 concentrates on understanding de-
cision making science, while 3.2 explores management accounting and its usage in deci-
sion making. Section 3.3 reflects on risk and benefit assessment, and how individuals 
attain perceptions of them. Section 3.4 assesses effective decision making in the context 
of manufacturing relocation decisions. The final section provides a synthesis of how each 
approach will specifically be applied to answering each research question.  
3.1 Decision making processes 
Decision making is a very hazy subject, which nevertheless does not fail to rank high in 
any manager’s list of important business skills. Out of a myriad of definitions for decision 
making, Teale et al. (2002) provide an overview of a few of them, presented in Table 5:  
Table 5: Definitions of decision making (Teale et al. 2002) 
Definition Original source 
Acts of choice between alternative courses of action designed to 
produce a specified result, and one made on a review of relevant 
information guided by explicit criteria. 
(Rose in Salaman & 
Thompson 1980: 187) 
A conscious and human process, involving both individual and 
social phenomena, based upon factual and value premises, which 
includes a choice of one behavioral activity from one or more al-
ternatives with the intention of moving towards some desired 
state of affairs. 
(Shull et al. in Harrison 
1999: 4) 
A moment, in an ongoing process of evaluating alternatives for 
meeting an objective, at which expectations about a particular 
course of action impel the decision-maker to select that course of 
action most likely to result in attaining the objective. 
(Harrison 1999:5) 
A commitment to action 
(Mintzberg 1983: 188) 
 
According to Mintzberg et al. (1976), when faced with complex situations (such as relo-
cating manufacturing facilities), decision makers try to reduce the decision into smaller 
subdecisions to which they apply generally known procedures and routines. The most 
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suitable definition for this thesis is thus the one by Shull et al, as it best reflects the lon-
gitudal nature of a real-life decision making process with its fits and starts, analyses and 
sub-decisions.  
Quite naturally, not all decisions are alike. The decision to hire new production staff or 
authorizing a standard upgrade to computer software is very different from deciding to 
move complete production facilities abroad. Teale et al. (2002) continue to suggest a cat-
egorization of decisions across three key dimensions: structure, programming and strate-
gic importance. Figure 6 provides an overview of what these dimensions mean: 
 
Figure 5: Categorization of managerial decisions (Teale et al. 2002) 
Reflecting manufacturing location decisions to this categorization, they are by definition 
more strategic than operative, many times more unstructured than structured and do not 
involve organizational programming, save for experienced multinationals for whom in-
ternational growth has been an integral part of their strategy. Mintzberg et al. (1976) de-
scribed this mix of decision environment attributes as simply strategic decision making, 
although strategic decisions do not always mean non-programmed and/or unstructured 
decisions according to Teale et al. Mintzberg et al. further elaborate on strategic decisions 
as follows: 
“…a strategic decision process is characterized by novelty, complexity and open-
endedness, by the fact that the organization usually begins with little understand-
ing of the decision situation it faces or the route to its solution, and only a vague 
21 
idea of what that solution might be and how it will be evaluated when it is devel-
oped.”  (Mintzberg et al. 1976) 
Because these sort of decisions are unstructured, ambiguous, and non-repeating, research-
ers have limited methods to investigate them with scientific rigor. Still, the literature on 
decision making has converged on a basic form of how decisions are made. This structure 
usually includes five main elements: identification of need, creating solution alternatives, 
evaluating the alternatives, choosing the solution and implementing. Figure 7 visualizes 
this structure with feedback loops: 
 
Figure 6: A simple decision making process (adapted from Ekanem 2005) 
This core process has been empirically found to be in line with reality in real organiza-
tions, although decision makers usually go through the process in several cycles, fits and 
starts, sometimes omitting elements and sometimes not (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki 1992). 
Nonetheless, the framework is a viable starting point to assess and model real decision 
processes.   
Building on this, a decision making framework constructed by Mintzberg et al (1976) 
targets strategic, ambiguous decisions more directly. They investigated 25 decisions made 
in high-risk environments, ranging from governmental organizations to corporations and 
from electronics to the hotel industry. Although all decisions investigated were charac-
terized as unstructured, they all involved some underlying structure that could be mod-
eled. Figure 8 describes a slightly simplified version of their model: 
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Figure 7: Strategic decision making process model(adapted from Mintzberg et al 1976) 
The authors describe their framework as follows. The model process begins with a recog-
nition of a problem to be solved, or a decision to be made. Triggering stimuli can amount 
from several external and internal sources, and sometimes they might be accumulated 
over a period of many years before the formal decision process is initiated. From there, 
the decision can follow any of the several possible paths along the decision routes.  
Recognition is usually followed by a diagnosis routine, where the decision makers 
strive to grasp a hold of the new situation by untapping existing information sources, 
opening new ones and beginning to define the problem into concrete terms.  
Diagnosis ends the identification phase, which is followed by a development (of solu-
tions to the problem) phase. Here, the decision makers can either search for existing so-
lutions or design one or more of their own. Searching for a solution might include search-
ing from memory, passively waiting for a solution to present itself, inform “solution 
agents”, such as suppliers, that a solution is sought after, or actively searching for solu-
tions from various information sources. Designing an in-house solution is a complex, it-
erative procedure usually involving teams and formal project organizations with a spe-
cific responsibility over arriving at a solution.  
Once alternatives have been found, the process moves on to screening the options, or 
eliminating those that are not feasible enough for further assessment.  
Screened options enter an evaluation/choice-routine. This routine can involve judg-
ment, evaluation or bargaining over the options. Judgement means arriving at conclu-
sions on some personal basis that individuals may not be able to explain. In bargaining 
the selection is made by a group of decision makers with some degree of conflicting in-
terests. Evaluation means factual analysis followed by either judgment or bargaining.  
Finally, the decision makers may be required to seek authorization for the selected 
option internally or externally, after which the formal decision process is over and imple-
mentation is begun. (Mintzberg et al. 1976) 
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All the individual decision processes that Mintzberg et al. investigated followed modified 
versions of this framework, with some sequences changed, some stages omitted. It can be 
thus seen that at its core, this model along with the simple decision making process in 
Figure 7 provide a solid backbone for modeling how the focal decisions in the case com-
panies of this thesis unfolded. On one hand it provides the researcher some structure into 
formulating interview questions, and on the other hand, implications can be drawn from 
deviations between the theoretical models and the real process investigated. 
A final dimension in studying the decisions is that of decision making groups. To model 
the dynamics of how information is exchanged and evaluated between decision making 
group members, the concept of pragmatic constructivism is introduced (Nørreklit et al. 
2010). Pragmatic constructivism is based on the assumption that four dimensions of real-
ity must be integrated in the actor-world relation, if the construct is to be a successfully 
utilized in taking action. These dimensions are facts, possibilities, values and communi-
cation. The relationships between the dimensions can be described as follows: facts are a 
necessary basis for action, but insufficient by themselves; without possibilities that are 
based on facts, there can be no action; possibilities create situations of choice, which must 
be assessed ultimately with respect to one’s values; finally, the integration of facts, pos-
sibilities and values must be communicated to enable action in a social setting (Nørreklit 
et al. 2010). Pragmatic constructivism adds to the mainstream realist paradigm in that it 
better explains deviations from rationality caused by social phenomena in the human be-
ings making decisions.  Based on this model decision making groups do not exchange 
and process objective, “pure” financial information in order to reach conclusions; instead, 
they form interpretations of information based on values that might differ between organ-
izations, divisions and individuals. Where some decisions may be made in contradiction 
to “objective”, rational information, pragmatic constructivism posits that those deviations 
are caused by the differing values and valuations that the realist view does not capture.  
Thus, to answer research question 1, the research will include an assessment of how the 
case decision processes can be modeled in terms of the frameworks in Figure 7 and Figure 
8, accompanied by a description of the interaction between decision makers and their 
choices based on the paradigm of pragmatic constructivism.  
3.2 Management accounting information in decision making 
In order answer research question number 2, the research needs to dig in to the use of 
management accounting information, which might be included in any or all sections of 
the decision making process. 
Management accounting (MA) can be defined as the act of gathering, analyzing and re-
porting information to managers for decision making, planning and controlling resources 
(Teale et al. 2002). The specific area of MA that relates to offshoring and backshoring 
decisions is capital investment decisions. The “classic” analysis methods used in capital 
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investment decisions involve financial models such as Accounting Rate of Return, Pay-
back Period, Net Present Value and Internal Rate of Return (Atrill & McLaney 2012). On 
another hand, some decisions defy simple financial analysis because they involve issues 
that are not easily quantifiable (Johnson & Kaplan 1987). This view on MA eventually 
led to the creation the balanced scorecard and other similar controlling tools to comple-
ment the classic investment analysis methods.  
From a paradigmatic viewpoint, the common position is that mainstream accounting the-
ory and practice emerge from the paradigm of realism (Ryan et al. 2002). This point of 
view holds that accounting should represent real world phenomena in numbers (Iijiri 
1967), represent them accurately (Sterling 1979) and without distorting the underlying 
reality (Sidebotham 1970). Thus, if realism is accepted as a paradigmatic base for ac-
counting, it should be viewed as objective, neutral and unbiased (Nørreklit et al. 2010). 
However, a contradiction could be argued from a social constructivist perspective, which 
states that there is no objective economic reality on which to base accounting reports 
(Tinker 1991). Accountants are constantly faced with the need for judgment, estimation 
and assumptions (Paton 1962), which leads to practice that can hardly remain objective 
and unbiased. For example, while MA as an activity is usually seen as a rather formal 
process, or a set of rules, sometimes very informal processes, loosely coupled to the for-
mal processes, ensure that even inefficient accounting practices can survive and be ac-
cepted within organizations (Lukka 2007). In this manner accountants and decision mak-
ers make constant trade-offs between well-founded, objective analysis and coping with 
the rushes of everyday business operation in order to have formal duties done on time, if 
only superficially – meaning basically that managers sometimes willfully abandon rigor-
ous objective analysis in favor of personal needs and objectives that do not connect with 
best interest of their organization.  
In another example, Johnson & Kaplan (1987) argue, that the bureaucratic procedures 
and cycles of organizations’ financial reporting systems lead to a situation where MA 
information is produced too late, too aggregated and too distorted to be relevant in deci-
sion making. Overwhelmed with too much or too little information, especially smaller 
companies sometimes resort to making investment decisions solely based on “gut feeling” 
(Atrill & McLaney 2012). Again, the distance between the ideal realist view of account-
ing and the real world practice is extended. 
To impose structure to the view on accounting, the notion of pragmatic constructivism is 
reintroduced. Nørreklit et al. (2010) specifically addressed the benefits of this paradigm 
in the realm of managerial accounting with a framework that is visualized in Figure 9: 
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Figure 8: The integration process of pragmatic constructivism (Nørreklit et al. 2010) 
In simple terms, pragmatic constructivism assumes that accountants create financial in-
formation by interpreting and selecting facts based on their values, which results in an 
understanding of a financial possibility. Selecting which possibilities to pursue is also 
informed by values. Finally, the possibilities are communicated in reports and otherwise 
to aid decision making, again influenced by the values that accountants or the collective 
accounting practice involve.  
Pragmatic constructivism extends to explain how accounting can be seen to fulfill not 
only the role of a rational number churner, but several different roles that emerge from 
the differing values and information needs of individuals. Where we see unexplainable 
irrational behavior from the realist viewpoint, such as accepting inefficient accounting 
practices in organizations, a constructivist would be intrigued to discover what kind of 
personal and organizational values have guided the behavior to seem so irrational. 
Burchell et al. (1980) categorized the roles that accounting can take in terms of the un-
certainties of the objectives laid for the decision and the cause and effect of the decision, 
as visualized in Figure 10:Figure 9: Uncertainty, decision making and the roles of ac-
counting practice (Burchell et al. 1980)  
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Figure 9: Uncertainty, decision making and the roles of accounting practice 
(Burchell et al. 1980) 
The authors elaborate on the definitions of each category as follows. Answer machines 
are instances of accounting that give definite or practically definite answers to problems 
of low uncertainty – an example might include pricing a product profitably in a non-
complex organization with a good knowledge of cost structure. When uncertainty over 
the causes and effects of a decision rises, accounting might be used more as a learning 
machine, or a facilitator of assessment and learning about the environment in which the 
results of the decision will occur. In a situation where the results of any decision are well 
known but there is some dispute over what the objectives should be, decision making can 
grow political qualities, and accounting might be used as an ammunition machine, provid-
ing proverbial ammunition to support each party’s particular position towards the deci-
sion. Finally, when there is high uncertainty of both the objectives and the effects of a 
decision, accounting might arise as a rationalization machine, providing justification and 
legitimization to decisions that have already been decided upon on. (Burchell et al. 1980) 
The role of accounting in offshoring and backshoring decisions has already been investi-
gated to some extent. Laine & Suomala (2016) found for example, that companies that 
have done both offshoring and backshoring perceive their financial information more use-
ful and supportive than those that have done only offshoring. In other words, backshoring 
decisions are supported by more accurate and relevant financial information. It could be 
thus assumed that backshoring requires more accurate analyses to actually anticipate and 
manage the financial consequences of the decision (Gylling et al. 2015; Laine & Suomala 
2016). However, utilizing the paradigm of pragmatic constructivism and the accounting 
role framework by Burchell et al. in case-based research could provide further insight into 
what exact function MA information serves at various points along real decision making 
processes in offshoring and backshoring.  
To answer research question 2, the research is thus chosen to include both an investigation 
of what kind of accounting information was used to support decision making, how the 
interplay between the decision makers eventually created a “demand” for this specific 
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information (in the spirit of pragmatic constructivism), and how could the role of account-
ing information be described in terms of the framework in Figure 10.  
3.3 Perception of risk and benefit 
Many studies have shown that decision risk, defined as “the extent to which there is un-
certainty about whether potentially significant and/or disappointing outcomes of deci-
sions will be realized” (Sitkin & Pablo 1992), is not a purely probabilistic, discrete quan-
tity of decision makers. Rather, perception of risk receives input from emotions, biases, 
prior experience and other such human qualities (e.g. Lerner et al. 2015; Simon 1979; 
Tversky & Kahneman 1986; Tversky & Kahneman 1974; Ashforth & Mael 1989). The 
same applies to perceived benefits: personal preference and positive previous experiences 
about a subject make individuals perceive it as less risky and more beneficial (Sjöberg 
2000).  
These specific deviations could be described as irrational and unconscious. The paradigm 
of pragmatic constructivism, which is used as a basis for investigating research questions 
1 and 2, could be utilized here as well, but it does not address the question of whether 
decision makers are conscious of the values that guide fact collection and possibility se-
lection. This means that a complementing theory should be added to account for inputs 
to risk and benefit perception that individuals are not directly aware of.  
To counter this lack in theoretical background, a dichotomy suggested by Slovic et al. 
(2005) can be considered: risk as feelings and risk as analysis. Risk as feelings refers to 
individuals’ fast, instinctive and intuitive reactions to risk. Risk as analysis is closer to 
what is understood by risk management: logic, reason and scientific deliberation used to 
analyze risk systematically. Actual perceptions of how risky or beneficial economic pos-
sibilities are then constructed based on the positivity or negativity of the input that is 
received from those two ways of reacting to risk. Slovic et al. refer to this emotional input 
as the affect heuristic. Affect is defined as the specific quality of goodness or badness 
either a) experienced as a feeling state (with or without consciousness) or b) demarcating 
a positive or negative quality of a stimulus. Effectively, affects are a pool of markers 
attachable to any idea that cause the idea to be experiences as high or low in risk. Using 
a readily available affect to quickly make decisions will many times feel more efficient 
than carefully analyzing options and their pros and cons (Slovic et al. 2005). The affect 
heuristic can thus make risk assessment objectively less reliable in complex situations. 
For example, witnessing an airplane crash landing certainly acts negatively on a person’s 
risk perception of flying, regardless of its true riskiness. Figure 11 describes this frame-
work visually: 
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Figure 10: Generation of risk perception (partially adapted from Slovic et al. 2005) 
Here, individual decision makers react to a need to assess a risk by drawing inputs from 
both the risk as feelings and risk as analysis paths. Risk as feelings encompasses all the 
irrational and especially sub-conscious arguments towards the goodness or badness of a 
choice, while risk as analysis covers the inputs that come from the objective realm, in-
cluding systematic analyses, checklists and procedures. MA information is here consid-
ered to belong to the objective realm, because its usage more or less requires conscious 
consideration regardless of what role it has taken in terms of the framework presented in 
section 3.2 in Figure 10. These inputs are then added together and weighed against each 
other: on one hand the positive affect heuristics from the risk as feelings source and pos-
itive information from the risk as analysis source, on the other hand negative affect heu-
ristics and negative information. This assessment finally results in a perception of the risk 
of a possibility being of some level.  
This framework will be utilized in the research to analyze the extent to which individual 
sub-decisions, such as considering individual location candidates, along the general deci-
sion making process were justified in terms of risk as feelings and risk as analysis.   
3.4 Effective decision making 
The fourth and final research question asks how organizations could make more informed 
and effective manufacturing location decisions. This calls for an unambiguous definition 
of decision making “effectiveness”. Dean Jr and Sharfman (1996) define strategic deci-
sion effectiveness as “the extent to which a decision achieves the objectives established 
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by management at the time it is made”. This is probably the simplest unambiguous man-
ner of measuring the quality of decisions. Decision making effectiveness is thus depend-
ent on both setting achievable targets and managing resources in a manner that the targets 
are achieved.  
In their article, Dean Jr and Sharfman (1996) showed empirically that two major factors 
have a strong influence on this effectiveness: procedural rationality and political behavior. 
Procedural rationality, defined as “the extent to which the decision process involves the 
collection of information relevant to the decision and the reliance upon analysis of this 
information in making the choice” was found to have a positive effect on decision quality 
(Dean Jr & Sharfman 1993 in Dean Jr & Sharfman 1996). Simplified, this would mean 
that decision makers that follow set procedures, use accurate MA information and reduce 
the risk of falsely trusting affect heuristics increase their probability of meeting the ob-
jectives of offshoring decisions. On the other hand, political behavior, defined as “inten-
tional acts of influence to enhance or protect the self-interest of individuals or groups” 
(Allen et al. 1979 in Dean Jr & Sharfman 1996), was conversely found to negatively affect 
strategic decision effectiveness. Political behavior seems to arise from differing interests 
that result from functional, hierarchical, professional and personal factors. 
One further separate factor will be taken into account in measuring decision effectiveness: 
cultural intelligence. Cultural intelligence is defined as “an individual’s capability to 
function and manage effectively in culturally diverse settings” (Ang & Inkpen 2008), and 
is argued to be critically important for companies to successfully leverage international 
ventures such as offshoring. 
Figure 12 presents these factors in a simple framework: 
 
Figure 11: Framework for investigating decision effectiveness (Dean Jr & Sharfman 
1996) 
As can be seen, each factor has a positive or negative effect on decision making effi-
ciency, or the probability that objectives set for the decision are met. However, to make 
sure that the framework is of practical usefulness when conducting the research, the fac-
tors should be opened into their components, which can then be identified in the case 
decision processes. This is clarified in Table 6:  
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Table 6: Components of the factors affecting offshoring decision making efficiency 
Factor Components 
Procedural rationality 
Utilizing MA information, using set procedures and frameworks 
to guide decision making, recognizing and fact-checking affect 
heuristics 
Political behavior 
Distortion or restriction of information flow, diverting decision 
making to serve personal interests 
Cultural intelligence 
Previous experience of target countries, education, involving na-
tives in the decision making process 
 
These traits will be sought after in the research to determine whether the case decisions 
were made from a solid platform of rigorous decision making, or whether they were con-
ducted in a manner that on average would set them on a course for difficulties in the 
relocation project. In addition, specific points of possible improvement in the decision 
process will be explored, in the vein of the question “if you had a chance to go through 
the decision process again, what would you do otherwise? 
3.5 Research framework 
The research framework is a systematic approach to clearly and concisely answer all the 
research questions: 
1. How can offshoring and backshoring decisions be modeled? 
2. What is the role of managerial accounting information in them? 
3. What factors influence decision makers’ assessments of risks and benefits in these 
decisions? 
4. How could companies make more effective offshoring and backshoring deci-
sions? 
In order to answer questions number 1 and 2, a comprehensive description of the case 
decisions will be constructed based on interviews, with a focus on what triggered the 
decision process, what people and functions were involved in it, what information was 
utilized and what was the role of management accounting information in it. The frame-
works in Figures 7 and 8 will be utilized to construct a clear process timeline of how the 
decisions unfolded, while the frameworks in Figures 9 and 10 will aid in laying structure 
on what the role of accounting information actually was. 
In order to answer question number 3, the interviews will be designed to encourage inter-
viewees to describe the inputs into important sub-decisions along the major decision pro-
cess in as much detail as possible. These inputs will be categorized based on the risk as 
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feelings vs risk as analysis framework in Figure 11, making it possible to determine what 
exact factors had an effect on how risky or beneficial individual decision makers thought 
various location options were along the decision process.  
Finally, in order to answer question number 4, the described case decision process will 
be examined to see how much of the decision making involved procedural rationality, 
whether the irrational inputs positively or negatively affected the decision effectiveness, 
and whether there was any evidence of political behavior. An intervention will be con-
structed, where improvement suggestions are offered to the interviewees. They are asked 
to comment on the intervention, providing validation of whether they perceive the sug-
gestions as improving their decision making processes or not. 
32 
4. RESEARCH STRATEGY 
This chapter describes choices made regarding research strategy and the timeline of exe-
cution. Section 4.1 presents the chosen research strategy and a methodology-based ra-
tionale for choosing it. Section 4.2 presents the chosen data gathering methods, including 
an assessment of their strengths and weaknesses. Section 4.3 describes the measures taken 
to ensure the validity, reliability and generalizability of results. The fourth and final sec-
tion presents the schedule and timeline on which the research was conducted.  
4.1 Methodology choices 
The chosen research strategy can be described as a qualitative case study with semi-struc-
tured interviews as the main data gathering method (Saunders et al. 2009; Hutchinson & 
Skodol-Wilson 1992). In order to locate this specific strategy in the general framework 
of business research, a brief background is provided next. 
Business research can roughly be divided into two main categories: qualitative and quan-
titative research. Qualitative research methods can include case studies, field studies, 
grounded theory, document studies, naturalistic inquiry, observational studies, interview 
studies and descriptive studies. On the other hand, quantitative methods include empirical 
studies and/or statistical studies. (Newman & Benz 1998) A qualitative approach is suit-
able for the needs of this study, since qualitative research is concerned with providing 
answers to questions such as (Hancock et al. 2009): 
 Why people behave the way they do 
 How opinions and attitudes are formed 
 How people are affected by the events that go around them 
 How and why cultures and practices have developed the way they have 
Qualitative case study was chosen as the overarching research method for two main rea-
sons. Firstly, decision making processes in offshoring and backshoring decisions are a 
highly specific subject for which very little publicly available material exists. Actively 
connecting with decision makers in interviews and conversations is needed, since even 
board meeting minutes rarely capture the all the details of decision making. Secondly, it 
is very hard to quantify aspects relating to decision making processes, especially when it 
comes to such abstract concepts as perception of risks and benefits. 
As per a basic research paradigm, the thesis assumes an interpretivist position to explain 
managers’ decision making behavior. Interpretivism argues that it is necessary for the 
researcher to understand the social roles of individuals in everyday life and business. In 
order to achieve this, the researcher has to adopt an empathetic stance, entering the social 
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world of the research subjects and occupying their points of view (Saunders et al. 2009). 
This paradigmatic position lends itself to most conveniently and effectively explain the 
phenomena that are investigated through interviews, as the data consisted of largely the 
personal accounts and interpretations of individual interviewees about how the focal de-
cision making process unfolded in their company.  
4.2 Data gathering methods 
One of the most important decisions regarding case study research is choosing suitable 
data gathering methods. The possible methods can be categorized as follows (Gummesson 
1993):  
 Using existing material 
 Questionnaires and surveys 
 Interviews 
 Observation 
 Action research 
 
Firstly, using existing material to conduct research allows for completely non-obtrusive 
means of generating and analyzing data. Possible sources of data include previous litera-
ture, press releases, publicly available profit and loss statements and data provided by 
third parties.  
Second, questionnaires and surveys involve standardized sets of questions. They are usu-
ally constructed in a way that allows for some degree of quantitative analysis of the re-
sulting data. 
Third, interviews are a less structured means of gathering data, usually take more time 
and allow for little quantitative analysis. On the other hand, interviews usually enable 
deeper connections to the information source and thus deeper understanding of the inves-
tigated phenomena. 
Fourth, observation as a research method can be roughly divided into two: non-interactive 
and interactive. Non-interactive observation includes simply observing the investigated 
phenomenon with a minimum amount of actual interaction or obstruction of normal ac-
tivities. Interactive observation on the other hand might include very heavy interaction, 
but also allows for a deeper viewpoint into the phenomenon. 
Finally, action research is a method that includes direct involvement from the researcher, 
which then can have a manipulative effect on phenomenon investigated. (Gummesson 
1993.)  
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The main data gathering methods in this study included semi-structured interviews and 
an intervention towards the end of the study process. A multiple method strategy was 
chosen, because it provides a chance to first get a feel for key issues and be guided into 
concentrating on the most valuable aspects of the research, and then use other, more fo-
cused methods to hone in on those key aspects in order to answer the research questions 
(Saunders et al. 2009).  
4.2.1 Semi-structured interviews 
A semi-structured interview can be defined as a purposeful conversation, in which the 
researcher will have a list of themes and questions to be covered, although they might 
differ from interview to interview. Some questions might be omitted in some interviews, 
while in others new and appropriate questions might be added ad hoc. (Saunders et al. 
2009) 
Semi-structured interviews also allow the interviewer to employ clarifying secondary 
questions, or probes  (Hutchinson & Skodol-Wilson 1992; Saunders et al. 2009). Probing 
can be a valuable method of ensuring the validity of data gathered through interviews, 
due to the following reasons (list first presented in Barriball & While 1994): 
 Probing allows for the clarification of interesting and relevant issues raised by the 
interviewees (Hutchinson & Skodol-Wilson 1992) 
 Probing provides opportunities to explore sensitive issues (Nay-Brock 1984; 
Treece & Treece 1986) 
 Probing can elicit valuable and complete information (Gordon 1975; Austin 1981; 
Bailey 1987) 
 Probing enables the interviewer to explore and clarify inconsistencies within re-
spondents’ accounts 
 Probing can help respondents recall information for questions involving memory 
(Smith 1992) 
Saunders et al. (2009) list several situations where using qualitative, semi-structured in-
terviews can be advantageous. These situations can be grouped and explained as follows 
(Saunders et al. 2009): 
 The purpose of the research 
 The significance of establishing personal contact 
 The nature of the data collection questions 
 Length of time required and completeness of the process 
Firstly, semi-structured interviews are a likely part of a research design when the research 
involves an exploratory or an explanatory aspect (Saunders et al. 2009). The research 
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questions of this thesis relate to a relatively little studied subject, and there is an explan-
atory aspect present in that the thesis attempts to explain causal relationships between risk 
and benefit perceptions and their causes.  
Secondly, managers are more likely to agree to be interviewed in person than to fill in 
questionnaires. In addition, interviews allow the researcher provide the interviewees fur-
ther assurance of how the collected data will be used. 
Thirdly, an interview will be the most advantageous option especially when the questions 
are either complex or open-ended, or when the order and logic of questioning may need 
to be varied (Saunders et al. 2009). This is definitely the case in this thesis, as even the 
order in which different decision makers are interviewed might have an effect in what 
data ends up being gathered. 
Finally, conducting interviews gives the respondent manager more control over how 
much time they devote to the data gathering process, compared to filling surveys. This is 
another aspect that makes them on average more willing to agree to be interviewed 
(Saunders et al. 2009). 
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4.2.2 Interventions 
Interventionist research is a close relative of action research and case studies. According 
to Jönsson and Lukka (2005) interventionist research should be seen as a sub-category of 
case studies, that consists of a group of several different data gathering methods. In inter-
ventionist research, the researcher actively contributes to problem solving and developing 
the targeted organization. This hands-on approach is then used to build theoretical 
knowledge, which separates this type of research from consulting (Lukka & Jönsson 
2005). 
Active participation is simultaneously considered a strength and a challenge of interven-
tionist research (Lukka 2000; Argyris et al. 1985). In it, the researcher engages in a type 
of experimental research set in a practical environment, trying to find and create settings 
that are relevant to the research questions. This provides good chances to capture pro-
found scientific insights that are also useful and practical to managers. In addition, the 
phenomena investigated usually take place very near the observer, since it is the re-
searcher that in part initiates them (Lukka & Jönsson 2005). On the other hand, the re-
searcher cannot completely control the research settings, but has to react to changes taking 
place in the organization (Saunders et al. 2009).  
What specifies interventionist research as its own branch of action research is the inter-
vention. In non-interventionist action research the researcher primarily acts as an ob-
server, even though he/she is contributing to problem solving in the organization, whereas 
in interventionist research the researcher acts as an active facilitator of change, trying to 
exert an influence on the organization under observation (Suomala & Lyly-Yrjänäinen 
2012). This induced change then is the phenomenon of interest to the researcher. 
In this research, the researcher tried to position himself as a half-academic, half-consult-
ant, acting both as a gatherer of information as well as provider of tailored knowledge 
that might create real value through improved decision making processes for the case 
companies. Assuming such a position helped in establishing a relationship with the inter-
viewees, as some of them explicitly became more interested in the subject after hearing 
they were going to see the results of the research with a focus on developing their own 
organization. 
4.3 Weaknesses of the research strategy 
Reliability, validity generalizability are measures of the trustworthiness, rigor and quality 
of research (Golafshani 2003). Validity refers to being able to provide evidence that the 
object or phenomenon of interest was actually the one measured. Reliability means that 
the measurement methods should be able to produce the same results in the same condi-
tions repeatedly. Generalizability refers to being able to infer results from a specific case 
to apply to a population. (Stenbacka 2001) 
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In order to ensure that all three of these are preserved to the greatest extent, weaknesses 
of the research strategy were identified by consulting literature on qualitative research, 
semi-structured interviews and interventions. The identified weaknesses are presented in 
Table 7: 
Table 7: Identified weaknesses of the research strategy 
Category Weaknesses 
Validity  The comments, tone or non-verbal behavior of the inter-
viewer can lead to a bias in how the respondent answers 
questions (Saunders et al. 2009) 
 Qualitative research rarely succeeds in isolating the varia-
ble of interest from other variables (distinguishing the sig-
nal from the noise) (Hancock et al. 2009) 
 Validity of qualitative research cannot be determined ob-
jectively (Gabriel 1990) 
Reliability  Since qualitative research concerns ever-changing hu-
mans, organizations and societies, there is no objectively 
reliable measurement method (Golafshani 2003)  
Generalizability  Results may not be generalizable to a larger population due 
to a small sample size and that the participants were not 
chosen randomly (Hancock et al. 2009) 
 
These vulnerabilities were kept in mind throughout the research process, and mitigation 
efforts to reduce their prevalence were taken. The exact means of how the weaknesses 
were addressed will be examined in section 6.3: Limitations. 
4.4 Research schedule 
The research was mainly conducted over the period of April – September 2016. The first 
month was spent mostly getting acquainted with the subject and building a theoretical 
starting point for the investigation. Interviewees for the study were selected based on their 
involvement or knowledge of the relocation decision in question. The interviews took 
place all over the summer. A summary of all interviews conducted is presented in Table 
8:  
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Table 8: Summary of conducted interviews 
Interviewee             
identification 
Position in company at the time of 
decision / role in decision process 
Duration of        
interview 
CompanyA_Person1 
Business development manager / 
core decision team member 
65 minutes 
CompanyA_Person2 
Business controller / core decision 
team member 
50 minutes 
CompanyA_Person3 
Project manager for implementing 
decision 
55 minutes 
CompanyA_Person4 
Sourcing manager, Asia / no direct 
involvement in decision process 
30 minutes 
CompanyB_Person1 
CFO / no direct involvement in     
decision process 
50 minutes 
CompanyB_Person2 
VP of HR / no direct involvement in 
decision process 
55 minutes 
CompanyB_Person3 
Supply chain manager / project  
manager for implementing decision 
45 minutes 
CompanyC_Person1 
COO / primus motor of decision  
process  
50 minutes 
CompanyC_Person2 
Business development manager /  
significant contributor to decision 
process 
40 minutes 
 
Case company A is a medium-size Finnish family-owned and run company manufactur-
ing components for heavy industry. Their headquarters and main production facility has 
been situated in its current location in Finland since the 1970’s. They have recently started 
a production facility in Eastern Europe, in a country identified as country AX. This off-
shoring decision is also the case of interest for case company A. It should be noted that 
this decision was not an offshoring case as such, but a foreign investment in a manufac-
turing facility. However, this was seen as a suitable proxy for a pure offshoring decision, 
since one of the options of locating a new facility could have been Finland as well. 
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Case company B is a large Finnish company, also family owned, manufacturing ventila-
tion products and systems for industrial customers. Founded in the late 1960’s, their rev-
enue has grown to roughly 200 million in 2015. They have a presence on three continents 
and thirty countries. This case focuses on a recent decision to move production from an 
Eastern European country identified as Country BX to Finland. 
Case company C is a young, medium-size Finnish company that provides industrial light-
ing solutions. Their production and operation is currently completely domestic, following 
a backshoring decision to pull production back to Finland from Asia, from a country iden-
tified as Country CX. 
The interviews were conducted mainly via phone or meeting software, apart from the 
interview with CompanyA_Person3, which was done face-to-face at the Company A’s 
premises. Meticulous notes were made from each interview, excluding the face-to-face 
interview which was audio-recorded. All interviewees were first asked to state their his-
tory in the company, as well as their role in the focal decision process. The rest of the 
interview depended on how many people from the same company had already been in-
terviewed. It was seen as beneficial to interview each person individually versus as a 
group. This allowed for the possibility of differing views and opinions emerging, without 
the influence of other decision team members in the room. The story behind each decision 
could also thus be verified through several individual and independent accounts.  
The selected interviewees turned out to be very informative and fitting for the questions 
asked, as some form of saturation could be noticed even in Company C, from which only 
two people were interviewed. That is to say, the stories from each interviewee more or 
less supported the stories of other interviewees from the same company. This was seen as 
a signal that the true course of events was accessed and recorded.  
Arranging the interviews was somewhat challenging due to interviewees’ schedule re-
straints, but all of them could be executed over the summer. The last interview was con-
ducted in the middle of August. Once all data was gathered, it was categorized per re-
search question and analyzed using the frameworks as specified in section 3.4.  After this, 
the preliminary results of the research were sent for review to the interviewees, who were 
asked to comment on their accuracy and especially on the validity of the recommenda-
tions for improving the efficiency of decision making. The research was concluded by 
integrating those comments to the research document and doing a final revision of the 
whole project and thesis document. 
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5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter summarizes the results gathered from the case companies and analyzes them 
with respect to the theoretical frameworks presented in chapter 3.5. The first three sec-
tions of this chapter present and analyze the findings from case companies A, B and C, 
respectively. The final section builds a synthesis from all three cases in order to draw 
relevant higher level insights for the research objectives.  
5.1 Findings from case company A 
5.1.1 Description of case decision process 
Company A’s decision process to offshore production from Finland to Country AX in 
Eastern Europe took place over a roughly 3-year period from the first considerations of 
international expansion in late 2000’s to founding a subsidiary to the targeted country in 
the early 2010’s. The decision was made mainly by an informal project group of three 
decision makers, one of whom was the then CEO of the company. A formal project or-
ganization was established only after the final location decision was made and the build-
ing of a production facility was starting. The rest of the executive board intermittently 
contributed to decision making during the 3-year period.  
There were no formally set objectives for the decision, although from the very beginning 
there was a general consensus that the goal of the project team was to find a brownfield 
investment (purchasing an existing manufacturing facility from their current owners) 
somewhere in Eastern Europe, in which the production of high volume – low mix com-
ponents was less costly than in Finland. Conversely, the idea was to retain the manufac-
turing of tailored, low volume – high mix products in the company’s factory in Finland, 
where their production was still considered more beneficial when all aspects like flexibil-
ity and closeness to R&D were taken into account.  
The interviewees agreed that there was no single factor that triggered the decision to lo-
cate the new factory abroad. Instead, many factors from different sources were filtered 
and condensed into a formal initiative to move forward with an internationalization effort. 
The primus motor of this initiative was the executive responsible for business develop-
ment in the company. Some of the most important factors that contributed to triggering 
the decision included: 
 The company’s strategic choice to pursue growth, combined with the fact that they 
already had market leadership and little room to grow further within Finland 
 Requests and ideas from customers to locate facilities nearer to them  
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 Preliminary investigations by the company’s sourcing team on cheaper compo-
nents to be manufactured in or sourced from Eastern Europe   
 Cost pressure from Central European customers on high volume – low mix prod-
ucts, caused mainly by high labor costs in Finland 
CompanyA_Person1, the then business development manager, emphasized in his inter-
view that the most important factor of these was not cost pressure, but the company’s 
willingness to grow and develop itself. Thus, this case is not directly representative of the 
average manufacturing location decision, which is mainly driven by the pursuit of lower 
costs. On the other hand, once the company had decided to pursue growth internationally, 
cost pressure was the factor that had most impact on what kind of growth was reasonable 
for the decision makers. Therefore, the decision to locate production abroad was moti-
vated by strategy, while the choice of location was strongly influenced by cost consider-
ations. 
No-one in the decision making team had previous experience of making foreign direct 
investment (FDI) decisions, apart from possible simulations in their business education. 
This meant that the decision process was marked by a lack of pre-set structure, learning 
by doing and utilizing ad hoc methods to move forward. As a starting point, the team used 
a generic FDI decision framework as a checklist when analyzing possible countries to 
invest in. The team acknowledged at an early stage, however, that their lack of experience 
created a need for external experts, and thus they decided to seek support from FinPro, a 
state-owned company whose purpose is to facilitate Finnish exports. FinPro was able to 
provide the case company information about countries’ business environment, culture and 
other aspects. Other sources of information, like contacts and various internet resources 
were utilized as well. 
Once the available sources of information were exhausted and a couple of countries had 
been shortlisted, the team decided to target prospect brownfield-sites and do personal 
visits to them. During the second year of the decision process, several separate visits were 
made to three different East-European countries. The sites worth visiting were mainly 
proposed to the company by FinPro, and were chosen based on their distance to Central 
European customers and available cost/profit information.  
The site visits formed to be a very interesting part of the decision process, from both the 
viewpoints of the decision making team and the researcher. The backbone of the investi-
gations that the team made into each location were quantitative data about the facility’s 
operation and financials, including accounting simulations with an imagined production 
line operating at the location. However, all three interviewees that had taken part in the 
decision directly mentioned, that the critical aspects that determined whether a location 
was considered good or not turned out to be very qualitative attributes. These attributes 
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included for example how easy it was to communicate with the site managers, how effi-
cient and suitable the manufacturing process looked like, and what kind of an overall 
feeling the visit left on the decision makers. As CompanyA_Person2 put it,  
“…it was the feelings and understanding that emerged during negotiations that had the 
biggest role in those last moments of the location decisions”.  
At a point where some of these visits had already been made, Country AX emerged as 
the chosen country for the manufacturing location, meaning that further locations inves-
tigated would only be considered from Country AX. The main reasons for choosing 
Country AX over other countries were 
 Cost level 
 General level of skill and education compared to cost level 
 Geographical location next to Central Europe 
 Presence of a large potential customer, with whom the company had previous re-
lations with 
 Political stability 
 Lack of corruption compared to other East-European countries considered 
 Country AX itself formed an interesting market for the company, especially for 
their services department 
At this stage, brownfield investments were still the preferred investment strategy, but it 
started to seem that greenfield (building a facility from ground up) could in fact prove 
much easier to implement overall, as the decision makers were not content with any ex-
isting facility visited. Several locations in Country AX were researched, and as the list of 
potential sites reduced in size, the amount of analysis and accounting simulations in-
creased. The team utilized two main methods to compare sites in Country AX. First, there 
were budgeting simulations on existing products that were currently produced in Finland, 
based on cost information provided by the sites. Second, there were budgeting simulations 
based on P&L statements of local competitor companies, to give a rough estimate of what 
kind of margins producing in Country AX might achieve. 
In the end, the chosen location was pinpointed at a Special Economic Zone business park. 
The main reasons to choose this specific location were listed as follows: 
 Abundant skilled labor due to similar industries’ heavy presence in the area 
 Good language skills 
 Very good logistical location with respect to central Europe 
 Very near to potential large customer 
 Reasonable labor cost (not the cheapest, nor the most expensive of considered 
options) 
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The critical of these aspects turned out to be the proximity to a highly potential large 
customer, a Finland-based OEM, with which company A had had some business earlier 
in Finland. They were also valuable to the decision makers in that they provided plenty 
of information about the business park and local environment based on their own experi-
ence.  
The consideration that required the most discussion and internal dialogue with the deci-
sion making team was that of what to produce in Country AX. The general idea had been 
clear from the start: high volume – low mix, or bulk products were to be produced there 
while more tailoring-oriented products would remain in Finland, but the specific mix of 
products was a subject for a lot of debate and analysis. 
Building the plant was begun roughly 6 months after the final decision was made. At this 
point the team decided to hire a Country AX native to lead the project. This decision was 
made to minimize the hindrances and costs related to navigating the regulatory formalities 
of operating in Country AX. 
In hindsight, the decision making team viewed the whole process as a success. No major 
drawbacks were encountered. The few significant problems faced and solved included a 
delay by a supplier of production machines to the offshored facility and spending too 
much time on weighing options to resolve an issue about how to organize an important 
production subprocess in the new location. Currently the facility is doing well and the 
managerial team is pleased with its performance. 
5.1.2 Analysis of the decision process 
To impose structure to the decision process, the frameworks presented in Figure 7 and 8 
of section 3.1 are utilized to construct a descriptive model, presented in Figure 13. It was 
found that the most reasonable approach is to simplify the overall process into a straight-
forward step-by-step process which includes nests of complex sub-decisions: 
 
Figure 12: A descriptive model of the decision process in case company A (feedback 
loops excluded) 
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The process started by recognizing the need to consider a foreign manufacturing invest-
ment. Next, diagnostic preliminary investigations were conducted by the company’s busi-
ness development manager. As an explicit commitment to invest abroad was made, the 
process entered a phase that included the identified key sub-decisions. Each can be de-
scribed to have had their own decision process with information gathering, evaluation and 
choosing a solution. However, no discrete sequence could be identified between the sub-
decisions: while some decisions were made prior to others, the decision makers pointed 
out that several sub-decisions were considered simultaneously and that in fact many op-
tions were kept open until very late in choosing the final location. Only once all the sub-
decisions had been made could the team continue to initiate implementation.  
The four sub-decisions (investment type, what to produce, target country and final loca-
tion) followed varying decision paths in terms of the strategic decision process model in 
Figure 8, depending on the type of decision. First, investing in an existing facility was 
initially considered to be practically a given, as having to supervise a construction project 
from square one was seen as a burden best avoided. However, as the team accrued 
knowledge of location candidates and especially as they visited locations personally, they 
eventually reached the conclusion that the best way to ensure a standard of quality and 
reasonable control of immediate infrastructure around the facility was to invest in a green-
field facility. 
Second, the choice of what to produce was probably the most complex of all four. The 
interviews did not uncover specifics about the analyses and debates that were included, 
but it was clear that several different investment calculations were drafted to support dif-
fering opinions within the decision making group. 
Third, the choice of target country followed a rather straightforward path of first gathering 
information about possible options, then evaluating alternatives both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, and concluding in locking the target country into Country AX once no 
promising location candidates were found elsewhere. 
Fourth, the choice of final location was basically an extension of finding a target country. 
(They are modeled as separate sub-decisions since they could be processed as completely 
separate entities, first selecting the country based on nation-level information and then 
selecting the final location based on individual location-level information.) Several loca-
tion candidates were identified with the help of FinPro and its counter-part in Country 
AX. This longlist was shortened by both quantitative means and by personally visiting 
sites, until certain factors dictated that the optimal location in this case was in western 
Country AX. 
As a summary, Table 9 describes the decision making paths for each sub-decision: 
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Table 9: Company A's subdecisions' decision paths, analyzed with the strategic deci-
sion process model in Figure 8 
Sub-decision Decision path 
Investment type 
Search (lock intent to invest in brownfield)  Evalua-
tion (by location visits)  Decision made (Switch to 
greenfield) 
Selecting target country 
Search  (information from FinPro and other sources) 
Screen  Evaluation (with significant input from loca-
tion visits)  Decision made  
Selecting what to        
produce 
Design (several suggestions from decision making team 
members)  Evaluation / Judgement / Bargaining (in-
ternal negotiations about best alternative, accounting 
simulations)  Decision made 
Selecting final location 
Search  Screen  Evaluation / Judgement (input from 
selecting target country and location visits)  Decision 
made 
 
The main observation here is that when the overall offshoring decision process is broken 
down into its components, several differing decision making paths emerge with differing 
objectives and complex process dependencies. For example, the objective of deciding on 
an investment type is to find a solution that balances economic feasibility and man-hours 
needed to supervise the investment, while the objective of deciding on what to produce is 
to find a mix of products that makes most sense given certain market conditions, and so 
on. Due to this complexity it became impossible to create a clear description of how each 
sub-decision evolved in time with respect to other sub-decisions.  
On the other hand, the fact remains that for example the chosen investment type does not 
affect directly the choice of product mix. Therefore, there is room to speculate whether a 
more optimal sequence of sub-decisions could be devised. This view was confirmed by 
CompanyA_Person3, who stated that there could have been more systematicity and a 
more sequential approach to the sub-decisions:  
An FDI-process does not have to involve that much meandering and iteration. There are 
definitely some decisions that could have been sequenced and gotten over with in an early 
stage.  
Remembering Dean & Sharfman’s (1996) definition of decision making effectiveness, 
“the extent to which a decision achieves the objectives established by management at the 
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time it is made” it can be argued that the overall effectiveness of an offshoring decision 
can depend on how well the decision maker is able to understand not only the objective 
of the grand objective of the whole offshoring project, but the objectives of each sub-
decision and their process dependencies.  
5.1.3 Role of MA information 
The role of MA information was also most reasonable to analyze in terms of the sub-
decisions. Based on the interviews, the role of MA information varied significantly be-
tween the sub-decisions, as presented in table 10: 
Table 10: Roles of MA information in Company A's sub-decisions 
Sub-decision Role of MA information 
Investment type N/A – Answer machine 
Selecting target country Learning machine  
Selecting what to        
produce 
Answer machine / Learning machine / ammunition ma-
chine 
Selecting final location Learning machine 
 
As can be seen, the role of accounting information as well varies between subdecisions. 
On one hand, the initial commitment to search for a brownfield investment was made 
completely based on gut-feeling, while in a later stage some calculations were needed 
relating to financing the newly chosen greenfield investment. On the other hand, the prod-
uct mix decision necessitated calculations that gave clear answers about what are the 
boundary conditions for the products to be produced, calculations that informed the deci-
sion makers about the economic reality of the location candidates’ production cost struc-
ture, and calculations that acted as arguments in the internal discussions.  
Examples of the types of calculations and MA information used include: 
 Simulations on different product lines 
 Budgeting scenarios including logistics, machine costs, raw materials 
 Simulations based on local competitors’ P&L statements 
 Economic and location specific data from FinPro / other sources 
In general, the whole process required a great amount of MA information for varying 
purposes and roles. However, the interviewees stated that uncertainty was still a great 
concern, meaning that while MA information was abundant, it was rarely accurate enough 
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to fully support informed decision making. This is most probably due to decision makers 
having to deal with e.g. facilities whose accounting practices they do not know, or prac-
tices that are deficient in some respect.  
5.1.4 Risk and benefit perception 
The decision making team based their risk management efforts on the aforementioned 
FDI framework. Figure 14 presents this framework at a high level.  
 
Figure 13: FDI factors to consider – framework used by case company A 
However, CompanyA_Person1 stated that in the end the risks that were analyzed in detail 
were picked more or less ad hoc, or based on “what came to mind”. This lack of structure 
has later been replaced with a new systematic risk assessment routine. 
The interviewees agreed that the most important risks that were discussed in the board 
room were demand risk (is there enough demand for the offshored facility?), financial 
risk (will there be sufficient funding for the investment?) and legal risks (will there be 
significant difficulties due to bureaucracy?). To analyze perceptions further, the decision 
was again divided into sub-decisions, as presented in Table 11. A “N/A” entry means in 
this case that the interviews did not uncover signs of risk perceptions being based on a 
particular source 
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Table 11: Risk perceptions in Company A’s sub-decisions 
Sub-decision Risk perception sources 
Investment type 
RISK AS ANALYSIS:  Scenario calculations 
RISK AS FEELINGS: Previous experience of large-
scale investments extrapolated to offshoring decisions 
Selecting target country 
RISK AS ANALYSIS:  Information from FinPro and 
Invest Poland 
RISK AS FEELINGS: N/A 
Selecting what to        
produce 
RISK AS ANALYSIS: Scenario calculations,  
RISK AS FEELINGS: N/A 
Selecting final location 
RISK AS ANALYSIS: Profit/loss scenarios, MA infor-
mation from brownfield-candidates 
RISK AS FEELINGS: Ease of communication with 
brownfield-candidate management, the looks of candi-
date’s production process, the looks of candidate’s im-
mediate location  
 
The major conclusion about risk perceptions is that the whole decision process mainly 
relied on thorough analysis methods and usage of numbers rather than feelings to support 
decisions. However, it cannot be denied that feelings and ad hoc assessments had a sig-
nificant role to play. This was especially true when choosing between final location can-
didates. A particularly interesting observation was the fact that while the actual final de-
cision was chosen most importantly due to the proximity of the large customer, individual 
locations were ruled out in the end based on a feeling that the location visits induced in 
the decision makers’ minds. CompanyA_Person4, who was not a participant in the deci-
sion process, stated that this feeling is most probably based on how smoothly the visit 
went, how easy it was to communicate with the local personnel, how tidy the location 
looked like and so on. He based this comment on his own experience of working several 
years in global procurement functions.  
Looking at the big picture, it could be argued that the high degree of uncertainty present 
in offshoring decisions necessitates some decisions to be made at least partially based on 
a risk as feelings-assessment. Companies and decision makers have a huge mental “exit-
barrier” to abandon an offshoring project simply because accurate MA information is not 
available – thus relying on “professional judgement” and “the feel acquired” becomes an 
acceptable manner of making a decision in order to move things forward. 
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5.1.5 Improving the decision making process 
All interviewees agreed that the main problems encountered during the decision process 
related to the lack of a predetermined systematic approach. While the process as a whole 
was seen as a success, especially when compared to the lack of previous experience, sev-
eral concrete action points for improvement were identified from the interviews, includ-
ing:  
 Systematizing and sequencing the processing of main subdecisions 
 Improving running documentation of decision making  
 Improving the decision making framework for FDI 
 Setting up a formal project organization sooner in the process 
 Communicating top management’s objectives clearly to the offshored facility’s 
management 
 More careful consideration of cultural differences  
In response to the identifying these action points, a synthesis package was constructed. 
The goal of the package was to on one hand deliver all the valuable insights from this 
research to the case company, and on another hand to invite comments and validation 
from the company’s management on whether these action points would truly make daily 
decision making more efficient. The package included for example a document template 
for documenting the running documentation, an augmented decision making framework 
and calls to action to discuss how the case company could improve their communication 
and cultural intelligence. 
In response to the package, CompanyA_Person1 stated that the whole interview project 
was a beneficial exercise for the company, in that it encouraged them to reflect on how 
decision processes should be viewed in the future. He especially saw the document tem-
plate for documenting running documentation of decision making as useful. Thus there is 
support for the argument that simple systematic routines and structured reflection on past 
decisions can make offshoring decision processes more efficient and informed. 
5.2 Findings from case company B 
5.2.1 Description of decision process 
The backdrop for this case was laid in early 2000’s, when the company acquired a Finnish 
producer operating in the same industry. The acquisition meant that company B margin-
ally branched out within its industry, intending to make use of synergy benefits like sim-
ilar customers and possibilities for solutions selling. Along with the acquisition came a 
production facility in Country BX. This facility was not seen as a strategic asset – it 
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merely provided an interesting possibility to establish a presence in Eastern Europe and 
serve customers in Central Europe more easily.  
The decision to backshore production from Country BX to Finland came after about 10 
years of operation. The decision process was markedly shorter than the offshoring case 
of company A: only about a year from first talks to initiate the process to the final deci-
sion. The process was initiated by the then production manager of the location to which 
production was eventually backshored.  
All in all, the bulk of decision making was done by the board chairman, who is also a 
member of the family that owns the company, and CompanyB_Person3, the then respon-
sible of maintaining the operation in Country BX. No separate project organization or 
formal decision processes were utilized in arriving at the final decision, although the 
backshoring decision as such was considered a project. 
Two main reasons to backshore were identified in this case. Firstly, the backshored facil-
ity made substantial losses for a prolonged period, over its whole existence within com-
pany B. One of the key reasons for the poor profitability was a barely existing local market 
for the products made in the facility. The cornerstone of the company’s competitive strat-
egy was to provide tailored, high-quality products with fast lead-times to customers they 
knew thoroughly. However, this strategy, which was highly effective in the domestic 
market of Finland, did nowhere near as well in Country BX and Eastern Europe. The 
customers demanded low-cost products and were reluctant to establish long-lasting sup-
plier-relationships with the case company, which resulted in a low but highly volatile 
demand pattern for the facility. On average, the demand for the products manufactured in 
Country BX was only about one sixth of the volume demanded from its Finnish counter-
part. The production basically had to be transported all the way to Finland in order to be 
sold, which was seen as unsustainable. 
Secondly, the business unit was systematically viewed as separate from the core compe-
tence of the company, making it that much easier to sell. The facility was a part of a 
business unit in one of the company’s divisions that produced products mainly from thin 
metal sheets. This facility, however, utilized a markedly different production method, in-
volving e.g. sewing and usage of components made of completely different metals. An-
other major difference from the rest of the division was that while most of the products 
could be sold to a certain type of customer, namely construction companies and their 
suppliers, the products from the business unit were targeted towards customers such as 
hotels and property maintenance firms. While intuitively close, these customer segments 
turned out to require very different types of service and lead-time. This degree of sepa-
rateness and lack of synergy had become a foundation for mentally locating the business 
unit outside the core activities of the company. 
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The decision process itself advanced as follows. After the issue was raised, the board and 
CompanyB_Person3 began contemplating the strategic level issues of the decision: in 
which of the domestic locations should production be backshored to? What should be 
physically brought in from Country BX? How to ensure knowledge transfer? The team 
also wanted to find a way to preserve the work force in Country BX, so they came up 
with replacement production that made more sense in the Country BX’s and East Euro-
pean market.  
After the higher level decisions had been made, CompanyB_Person3 was given a man-
date to implement. A step-by-step action plan was then designed, with the help of a per-
sonal visit to the site in Country BX. The physical backshoring operation involved sim-
ultaneously moving production equipment and knowledge from Country BX and from a 
second Finnish location of company B to the final backshore-location, as well as trans-
ferring equipment from the final location in Finland to Country BX to start the replace-
ment production there.  
Retrospectively the interviewees thought that the whole backshoring process was suc-
cessful and conformed to expectations. The main risk related to the relocation was a pe-
riod of a couple of weeks in which both the Country BX and the Finnish locations were 
ramped down and sales relied on a buffer stock accumulated earlier. No major draw-backs 
of any kind were met, however. The only point of improvement that the interviewees 
mentioned was to be more precise about product documentation, relating to products that 
ended up being the replacement production for the Country BX facility. 
5.2.2 Analysis of the decision process  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, company B’s decision process was significantly 
more straightforward than the offshoring case of company A, as visualized in Figure 15: 
 
Figure 14: Company B's decision process 
The process basically did not include any sub-decisions, as the major question was about 
transferring production from one owned location to another. The only key discussion to 
be had was about what exactly should be brought in from Country BX to Finland (ma-
chinery, information, key personnel etc.) and what to have produced in Country BX for 
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replacement. This discussion forms the core of the decision process from Design to the 
Judgement/Evaluation/Bargaining nest.  
The attitudes of the interviewees reflected the apparent simplicity of the decision. Com-
panyB_Person3 described the decision making process as “straightforward, data-driven 
and swift”, and that the decision makers had to deal with very little uncertainty. This 
raises the question of whether the company had had up-to-date information and awareness 
of when the parameters shifted enough to make a backshoring decision favorable. It is 
possible, that to some extent the swiftness of the decision process was a result of param-
eters shifting far enough (i.e. losing the economic sense of keeping the facility in Country 
BX) to make backshoring “a no-brainer”.  
5.2.3 Role of MA information 
For the role of MA information, a helpful mindset is to separate the decision into pre-
implementation considerations and implementation considerations. Practically no MA in-
formation was separately drafted to support the pre-implementation decision of “whether 
to backshore or not”. This decision was seen as a must-have, as CompanyB_Person3 
stated: 
Once the issue had been raised for consideration to the board, no-one saw practical 
counter-arguments to backshoring. 
As this was the general consensus among the team members, there were no separate de-
mands for specific MA information items to support the decision. The only pre-imple-
mentation MA information item mentioned by the interviewees was the general produc-
tion cost levels in Country BX and Finland. While it was slightly higher in Finland, the 
profit potential remained much higher for domestic production. Once the decision to 
backshore was officially made, MA information started to play an important role. Ac-
counting issues explored included labor cost, logistics cost, profitability, product level 
costs and customer preferences in East Europe – all items that most of all related to de-
ciding upon the specific products to be made both in Finland and Country BX. The accu-
racy of MA information was seen sufficient overall. This is most probably due to having 
to deal with only two locations, both of which were owned by the case company and thus 
measured in a manner that allowed precise assessments to be made. 
5.2.4 Perception of risk and benefit 
As pointed out in the previous section, the accuracy of accounting information created a 
situation where “there is practically no uncertainty”, as CompanyB_Person3 stated. There 
were no indications of basing the decision on a risk as feelings-source. The lack of per-
ceived uncertainty even led to an environment where failure of the project would have 
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been attributed to carelessness or inability to take clearly provided information into ac-
count, instead of an unprecedented external factor. Compared to the offshoring case, this 
is almost an opposite situation: the lack of perceived uncertainty might even create a false 
sense of security and inability to take higher level strategic risks into account. This is only 
speculation, however, and as it happened in this case, all the risks seemed to be taken into 
account fairly well, since the whole team considered the backshoring operation a major 
success.  
5.2.5 Improving the decision making process 
The only room for improvement in this specific decision case was identified by Com-
panyB_Person3, who mentioned product documentation as something that could have 
helped in transferring key process knowledge between national boundaries. Additionally, 
CompanyB_Person2 indicated that in his view the general manner of decision making in 
company B lacked a degree of systematicity and reliance on rigorous calculations. In 
terms of this research however, these points are too specific and vague (in respective 
order) to be worth exploring in detail to improve future decision processes for the com-
pany.  
In response to the suggestion package, CompanyB_Person3 stated that the most valuable 
pieces in the findings of this study related to quantifying the benefits of domestic produc-
tion: quality, flexibility and trustworthiness of suppliers. He saw that clear indicators and 
metrics related to these factors could have a decisive role in future off- and backshoring 
decisions for companies in Finland. On the other hand, he pushed back against the notion 
that relying on non-systematic analysis methods can be real weakness for decision making 
teams. He stated, that professional judgement is a truly valid tool in evaluating manufac-
turing relocation decisions, and that no systematic analysis methods exist that could cap-
ture all the different nuances that go into evaluating these decisions. Thus there is now a 
call for work in the field of quantifying hard-to-quantify factors, such as quality, flexibil-
ity and trust in developed countries vs. common offshoring locations. Also, Com-
panyB_Person3’s comment on professional judgement is perhaps a signal of the reality 
of day-to-day managerial work: making complex decisions seem to require some degree 
of judgement and gut-feeling, as sufficient methods of systematically going through the 
myriad interconnected factors do not yet exist. 
5.3 Findings from case company C 
5.3.1 Description of the decision process 
Company C’s decision to backshore production from Country CX to Finland took place 
over a period of about 4 months in the early 2010’s. The company had recently held a 
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string of meetings to update their strategy, which would henceforth focus heavily on un-
derstanding customer needs and providing tailored solutions. It was concluded, that the 
competitive edge of company C lies in providing not just cost savings, but also produc-
tivity, safety and even indirectly increased sales. This would be achieved mostly by uti-
lizing intelligent innovations by strategic partners in Finland. Such innovations had not 
been utilized by company C before, so investigations into how the new strategy could be 
implemented in practice were needed. These initial investigations revealed that maintain-
ing a production facility in Country CX and taking the most out of the new innovations 
was in fact not feasible simultaneously, since the facility could not accommodate the re-
quirements of the new technology. 
CompanyC_Person1, the then COO, brought this matter to the board, suggesting that the 
option of relocating the facility in Country CX to Finland, Eastern Europe or the Baltics 
should be considered. He was given a mandate to investigate further. After about a month 
later, the information gathered convinced the board to give a green light to relocate. Fur-
ther three months were needed to gather supporting information that allowed the final 
decision to backshore into Finland to be made. The bulk of investigating was done by 
CompanyC_Person1, with significant contributions from the then business development 
manager CompanyC_Person2 and the then CEO of the company. Final authorization 
came from the board. 
The root reasons that rendered Country CX financially unattractive were two-fold. First, 
with tailored products and the lead times the company wanted to achieve, outbound lo-
gistics had to rely on expensive air cargo. Second, the innovations by strategic partners 
in Finland would also have to be transported over huge distances for assembly, and then 
back again to European customers. In fact, these logistics costs more or less nullified the 
cost benefit of low labor costs in Country CX, compared to Finland or European locations. 
CompanyC_Person1 stated that while locations in several countries were considered, 
there was no separate phase of deciding upon a country first. All location candidates were 
initially treated as equals, which were then analyzed in detail. The analysis was structured 
into three main components: product development and ramp-up, production and logistics. 
Each component depended on the location in differing amounts, meaning that the “puz-
zle” had to be composed separately for each location to arrive at comparable figures. It 
should be noted however, that the company had just updated its strategy and faced a new 
way of working with the new innovations. Therefore, the calculations and analyses could 
mainly be based on estimates and scenarios. 
In the end, the decision came down to two locations in Finland and one in the Baltics. 
Visits were made to each location to support the decision. CompanyA_Person1 stated that 
the locations compared quite even against each other, and that it was more or less “the 
simple benefit of manufacturing at home” that was the crucial factor. When probed fur-
ther, he said that the main benefit about Finland, in this case, was the amount of trust 
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between contractors and the spirit of helping a fellow Finnish business. This seemed to 
be a major factor into why the implementation of the decision could be successfully un-
dertaken in less than six months, faster than the decision makers expected.  
CompanyC_Person1 mentioned two main risk categories that they should have consid-
ered more carefully: component availability / supply efficiency and quality issues. Per-
ception of these risks originated in a situation, where one of the potential new suppliers 
was not audited carefully enough. Otherwise, the interviewees did not see much to im-
prove in this instance of decision making. 
5.3.2 Analysis of the decision process 
The decision process was markedly similar to that of company B, with the exception of a 
brief Search/Screen phase to determine whether to relocate the production to Finland, 
Eastern Europe or the Baltics, as visualized by Figure 16:  
 
Figure 15: Company C's decision making process 
The process started with recognizing a problem with the compatibility of the company’s 
current assets, especially the production facility in Country CX, to the newly updated 
strategy that involves utilizing innovations from Finland. Next, after making the board 
aware of the problem, the COO was tasked with diagnosing the situation and providing a 
suggestion. After this quick diagnosis phase, a decision of intent was made to relocate 
closer to home. A phase of searching for existing location candidates was begun. No spe-
cial interest was shown towards locking a target country first. Candidates were found in 
Poland, Finland and the Baltics. The candidates were subsequently screened in terms of 
three major factors: product development and ramp-up, production and logistics. The 
three final candidates were evaluated in detail and visited personally, after one of the two 
finalist locations in Finland was chosen. Company3_Person3 stated that while a lot of 
thoughtwork went into the process, there was no preset systematic way of going about it 
– rather, all of the factors considered were assessed on an ad hoc basis.  
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5.3.3 Role of MA information 
The role of MA information remained quite static throughout the process, as it was mainly 
used as an answer / learning machine to shed light into the uncertainty that the newly 
updated strategy had cast over the company’s future. Calculations and analyses were 
needed to compare individual location candidates and simulating production and assem-
bly with the new components that the new innovative solutions required. The choice of 
relocating to Finland was locked quite early on, meaning that the bulk of the accounting 
information was used to support decision making relating setting up a supplier network. 
No evidence of political behavior or justifying past decisions were found, meaning that 
MA information was most probably not used as ammunition or rationalization machines. 
Lastly, it should be noted that the general decision to relocate production was in no way 
supported by MA information. Instead, the triggering information was created by arriving 
at a strategy that could not be sustained by remaining in Country CX.  
5.3.4 Perception of risk and benefit 
To some degree, company C’s situation was very similar to company B’s in terms of risk 
perception: the decision came down to moving production from a well known supplier to 
a supplier network in Finland, which as a nation was obviously thoroughly familiar as 
well. However, two things differentiate the two cases: company C had a brief phase of 
considering several country alternatives, followed by having to deal with setting up a new 
supplier network from scratch in Finland. The overall decision to relocate production was 
perceived to be of zero risk, as CompanyC_Person1 stated: 
Whatever the case, we would be better off by relocating from Country CX. 
In other respects, the uncertainty was seen as even rather high, especially with the bilateral 
relations to new suppliers that would enable company C’s new strategy of employing 
cutting edge technology and remote control in their solutions. This was explicitly stated 
as the riskiest aspect of the whole project. 
A conclusion could be thus drawn, when the situation of facing several new potential 
suppliers is compared to evaluating several location candidates for an offshoring project: 
the perceived riskiness of production relocation projects is connected to the amount and 
external facilities, companies and organizations that are considered as either the focal 
production facility or as parts of the new supply network. 
5.3.5 Improving the decision making process 
The only aspect that the interviewees from company C saw as worthy of improving was 
the risk assessment process, in their case relating specially to selecting and setting up a 
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supplier network in Finland. The company faced a single case of a fairly important sup-
plier that did not respond to expectations and threatened to hinder the implementation 
plan significantly. No major damage was accrued in the end. In other respects, it seemed 
that the perception of low uncertainty left no further room for improvements in the general 
process of making the decision. 
In response to the suggestion package, the interviewees did not have much to say, other 
than that they agreed with the findings. This is taken to indicate support for the main 
conclusions of this thesis. 
5.4 Synthesis 
If a step is taken back to look at the research results as a whole, comparing the offshoring 
case to the backshoring ones, the following insights can be drawn for offshoring and 
backshoring of production: 
Offshoring: 
1. Compared to backshoring, offshoring is like entering a fog of war – all new loca-
tion considerations are shrouded in uncertainty due to distance, mismatching ac-
counting practices, cultural differences etc. Reliable information sources and a 
systematic decision making process are crucial to successful decisions  
2. Offshoring companies should recognize that individual location decisions have to 
be made based on inferior information. Controlling the usage of non-accounting 
information (professional judgement, bias, preference) is of great importance. 
3. Companies planning to offshore need new ways to quantify the benefits of do-
mestic flexibility, quality and cultural aspects, as they are frequently found to be 
more valuable than expected in hindsight. 
Backshoring: 
1. It seems that many times backshoring decisions are triggered by realizing that the 
company will be better off by backshoring in any case. Optimally, companies 
should keep track of how the cost/benefit balance between an offshore and do-
mestic location develops over time to avoid such situations – which again calls 
for quantifying the benefits of domestic flexibility and quality. 
2. Companies seem to perceive backshoring decisions as involving ”practically zero 
uncertainty” due to knowing both locations involved in the final decision so well. 
This might make them vulnerable to poor planning. 
In very concise summary, companies would benefit most from improving the decision 
making practices, ensuring sufficient information from reliable sources to support the de-
cision making and quantifying the benefits of domestic production. The end result could 
be a lessened amount of manufacturing relocations overall, as the total value of domestic 
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production was more efficiently perceived and perhaps also utilized to a greater extent. 
From the point of view of the Finnish economy, applying these changes could have a 
positive effect on employment rates and economic growth in the long term.  
 
 
59 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presents the answers to the four research questions, evaluates how the find-
ings contribute to research in this field, what implications managers can draw from the 
thesis, limitations of the research and possible topics for further research. 
6.1 Answers to research questions 
The literature review for this thesis revealed four major research gaps in how we under-
stand offshoring and backshoring decisions, namely the day-to-day decision process mod-
els; the role of accounting information in them; how perceptions of risk involved in the 
decision are created; and what how could the decisions be made more efficient. The con-
ducted case studies successfully explored these gaps and provided insights for both im-
mediate practical use and for the leverage of further research. 
6.1.1 Modeling relocation decisions 
The first research question was set, targeting a specific question of the ROaMING project 
(Heikkilä 2015) as: 
How can offshoring and backshoring decisions be modeled? 
The research indicated that the decision making processes differ crucially between off-
shoring and backshoring decisions. However, it was found that they all could be modeled 
to relatively accurate extent by utilizing the strategic decision making model by 
Mintzberg et al. (1976).  
The offshoring case was a complex one, involving four major subdecisions, namely in-
vestment type, product mix to be produced, target country and final location. While some 
sequencing could have arguably been done to fast-track the process, the interviewees 
stated that all of the subdecisions were considered more or less simultaneously. The pro-
cess was led by three primary decision makers, supported by the board of the company. 
The process was marked by a degree of novelty and lack of experience of similar deci-
sions, which meant that the process included several fits and starts, lack of systematic 
thinking in arranging the decision making process and organizational learning as the pro-
cess advanced. However, compared to the initial driving factors which effectively became 
the objectives of the whole investment effort, the decision turned out to be surprisingly 
successful. 
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The two backshoring cases indicated that these decisions are made from a position of 
more accurate knowledge, experience and vision. In terms of the strategic decision mak-
ing model, the backshoring decision processes were dramatically simpler and shorter in 
time. The main reason for this difference in relation to the offshoring case was the simple 
fact that the backshoring cases were made concerning two well known or owned loca-
tions, which were therefore fitted with accounting practices that accurately serve the de-
cision makers’ needs. 
6.1.2 The role of management accounting information 
The second research question was set, again targeting ROaMING (Heikkilä 2015), as: 
What is the role of managerial accounting information in offshoring and back-
shoring decisions? 
This question was successfully explored utilizing a framework by Burchell et al. (1980), 
presented in Figure 10. The role of management accounting information was found to 
change as the offshoring process moved forward, but the most important finding was that 
while a great amount of MA information was needed for the whole decision to be made, 
it was rarely accurate enough to negate the need for qualitative assessments. The opposite 
was true in the backshoring cases: the role of MA information was quite clearly an answer 
machine when it came to the question of whether a backshoring decision should be made. 
In both cases the decision did not even require specific MA information items outside 
day-to-day reporting to be made. This was due to the fact that backshoring companies 
know each location very well, and that backshoring decisions more often relate to factor 
that is hard to quantify, such as a lack in quality of flexibility. 
6.1.3 Perception of risk and benefit 
The third research question was set, targeting a research gap indicated by Mihalache & 
Mihalache (2015), as: 
What factors influence decision makers’ assessments of risks and benefits relating 
to offshoring and backshoring of production?  
A two-factor model was created strongly based on the work of Slovic et al. (2005), where 
risk perceptions are contributed to from two main sources: risk as analysis and risk as 
feelings. The offshoring case indicated that the high degree of uncertainty that comes with 
having to consider several varying location candidates, product mix possibilities and in-
vestment type options means that at several points in the process MA information is not 
enough to create a solid information base for decisions to be made. The perceived riski-
ness of subdecision options were seen as high, and most interestingly final location can-
didates were ultimately judged by “the feeling acquired” from personal visits to the sites. 
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In conclusion, while decision making mostly relied on factual data and accounting prac-
tices, a significant amount of decisions along the process were at least partly supported 
by risk assessments that originate from feelings. In other words, a significant amount of 
the perceived risk levels is affected by non-systematic analyses and methods. 
In the backshoring cases the amount of relevant and accurate MA information created an 
environment that was perceived almost void of uncertainty. In both backshoring cases, 
the need to backshore in the first place was very clear, and the only real decision to be 
made was that of what and how to produce domestically. It could be argued that this 
perceived confidence in information quality could even be harmful, if decision makers 
become overly confident.  
6.1.4  Efficiency of decision making 
The fourth research question was set, targeting a research gap stated by K.C. (2015), as: 
How could companies make more effective offshoring and backshoring deci-
sions? 
Each case company was provided with a summary of the research specifically considering 
them, including an assessment of how their decision making in subsequent foreign direct 
investments could be improved. After analyzing both the interviews that explored inter-
viewees personal views of possible improvements and the comments that were received 
about the concrete improvement suggestions, two main areas of improvement arose: the 
decision processes themselves and quantifying the value of producing domestically more 
precisely.  
The first could be achieved mainly by having companies reflect on their respective prac-
tices and routines of making decisions. Is there a clear running documentation of how the 
process advances? Are reliable information sources utilized? Does the process as a whole 
follow a fitting framework for the decision at hand?  
The second is much harder to implement, as no standardized methods of quantifying fac-
tors such as quality, flexibility and trust compared between different locations exist yet. 
Thus it is taken as a very prominent target for further investigation and research. 
6.2 Research Contribution and managerial implications 
The findings of this thesis provide valuable insight into how decisions about manufactur-
ing relocation are actually made in the board rooms of companies. 
One of the major high-level conclusion of this research is that the immense amount of 
failed offshoring decisions globally results mainly from the degree of complexity these 
decisions involve. Offshoring is like venturing into a proverbial fog of war, or a fog of 
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uncertainty that covers all parts of the world that the offshoring company does not know 
intimately. Not only do companies need to uncover relevant information from under the 
fog, but they also need to make decision on where to aim their limited information seeking 
resources in the first place. It was also found that without prior experience, companies 
can be somewhat overwhelmed by the complexity of offshoring projects. Following pre-
set decision making frameworks, routines and rigorous data-based decision making pro-
cesses decreases the chance of failure, but keeping oneself constantly aware of the myriad 
of moving pieces that offshoring decisions include seems to be too large a challenge for 
many companies. Companies should invest effort in setting up rigorous systems that sup-
port systematic decision making, as well as finding suitable, relevant and sufficient infor-
mation sources about individual location candidates. 
Meanwhile, backshoring is usually seen as a straightforward investment decision between 
two alternatives: the offshored facility and a domestic location. Usually, both locations 
are very well understood and measured by management, which makes comparing the al-
ternatives and making informed decisions simpler and easier. The research showed that 
on a general level this is true: backshoring projects are shorter, simpler and require less 
resources to manage. On the other hand, this perceived lack of uncertainty might prove 
problematic to companies either as a false sense of safety or as a signal of letting the 
situation go sour enough to justify a backshoring operation in all scenarios. 
One clear indication of contribution to existing literature was that this thesis could un-
cover a fact that could not have been uncovered from the survey data conducted for the 
ROaMING project. The survey data was initially interpreted to argue that companies re-
quire more detailed management accounting information before daring to backshore – 
however, as this investigation states, it is the innate familiarity and common accounting 
practices of two owned or well known locations that give rise to very detailed accounting 
information in backshoring decisions compared to offshoring decisions, not a specific 
need to produce that information.  
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6.3 Limitations and mitigation efforts 
Weaknesses of the research strategy were outlined in section 4.3. In response, several 
concrete actions were taken to ensure the quality of the research. These are presented in 
Table 12: 
Table 12: Mitigation methods to ensure research quality 
Attribute to enforce Mitigation methods 
Validity  Informing interviewees about the themes of the research 
in advance in order to allow them to properly prepare to 
provide relevant information 
 Have key informants review the results  
 Proper background work to understand possible sources 
of bias in interviewing and analyzing data 
 Triangulation through mixed-method research 
(Saunders et al. 2009) 
 Triangulation through verifying accounts from more 
than one interviewee within the same organization 
(Saunders et al. 2009) 
Reliability  Rigorous documentation of the research process and ra-
tionale behind research strategy choices (Stenbacka 
2001) 
Generalization  Selecting interviewees that were either the decision 
makers or close to the decision making process (all of 
which still worked in the focal company) 
 Using an intervention to cause ripples in the normal 
flow of interviewees’ views about decision making, and 
to see if research results are seen to have practical value 
 
Having utilized these measures, it can be assumed that the study reached a sufficient level 
of scientific rigor in qualitative research.  
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6.4 Topics for Further Research 
Three important topics were identified as possible starting points for further research. 
Firstly, the research did not completely reach the anticipated depth in investigating how 
MA information was used in the case decisions. Its role in various parts of the process 
was uncovered, but further research could be aimed at understanding the information 
needs and suggested accounting information tools of various sub-decisions in more detail.  
Secondly, the two backshoring cases revealed how intricate and varying backshoring pro-
jects really are: company B relatively simply transferred machinery and knowledge from 
one owned location to the next, while company C arrived at owning domestic production 
by first transferring outsourced foreign production to a network of domestic suppliers. 
The task of constructing the supplier network from scratch added a whole dimension of 
uncertainty to the second case, which makes directly comparing the backshoring cases 
problematic. Further investigations could go deeper into understanding the methods of 
relocating production, as now the umbrella term of backshoring includes a rather wide 
array of different situations. 
Finally, a strong encouragement is given to finding ways to quantify or otherwise make 
concrete the hard-to-quantify benefits of domestic production, such as quality, flexibility 
and trust. This might have a true effect in keeping domestic companies from venturing 
into unnecessarily risky offshoring projects, only to learn the value of those benefits the 
hard way.  
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I 
APPENDIX A – EXAMPLE OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS   
These are the questions that were prepared for interviewing CompanyA_Person1: 
- Please shortly state your background in the company. Also specify your role/roles 
in the focal location decision 
- How would you describe your company’s competitive advantages over your com-
petitors? 
- How did the decision process begin?  
o When?  
o What motivators were there for it? 
o Who initiated the process? 
- What do you think were the most important reasons for having to make this deci-
sion? 
- How did you begin to solve the problem of deciding the location? 
- What kind of calculations, analyses and plans were used? 
- What kind of metrics/checklists were used to assess risks and benefits of each 
option? 
o How were risks mitigated? 
o Were there any realized risks along the process? 
- What were the decisive benefits of the chosen location over other options? 
- What are the negative sides in the chosen location? 
- What positive and negative feelings do you have about the decision making pro-
cess as a whole? 
o What did you think about the group dynamic of the decision makers? 
 
II 
APPENDIX B –  SAMPLE FROM IMPROVEMENT SUGGESTION 
PACKAGE 
 
 
 
 
